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NOTES
THE FORGOTTEN PUBLIC POLICIES BEHIND
THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT:
BURDEN OF PROOF STRUCTURES PLACING
UNNECESSARY BURDENS ON EMPLOYEES'
STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT
Lisa B. Feinstein*
INTRODUCTION
"I'm still shocked at my sudden plunge from economic selfsufficiency to dependence, all because I needed time off for family
and medical needs," testified Carmen Maya to the Subcommittee on
Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism, during hearings on family
Maya was describing to the
and medical leave legislation.1
subcommittee the troubles she faced after she took twelve weeks of
leave due to her medical complications and her child's Down's
syndrome.2 Myra Guski described being forced to resign from her job
to care for her dying father after her employer refused to grant a
temporary family leave.' She testified: "[M]y parents' need shouldn't
have put my job in jeopardy."4 Similarly, Thomas Riley described his
termination after the death of his son.' He had taken six days, which
were uncompensated, to care for his terminally ill child.6 He testified:
"I have always worked hard for a living, and taken pride in providing
for my family.... I don't want any, or expect any, special favors ....
But I don't think that parents should be forced to choose between
caring for their children or keeping their jobs."7

* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
parents, family, friends, and Evan for their unconditional love, support, and
encouragement.
1. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 10.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N at 13.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 9-10, reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11-12.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 12.
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Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") in
1993,8 to ensure that workers would no longer have to choose between
8. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat 6 (codified
at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2000) and 29 U.S.C. (2000)). Section 2612 describes
the leave requirement as follows:
§ 2612. Leave requirement
(a) In general
(1) Entitlement to leave.
Subject to section 2613 of this title, an eligible employee shall be entitled to a
total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for one or more
of the following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in
order to care for such son or daughter.
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for
adoption or foster care.
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or son, daughter, or parent, of the
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition.
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee
unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee ....
29 U.S.C. § 2612. Section 2614 reads in pertinent part:
§ 2614. Employment and benefits protection
(a) Restoration to position
(1) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b), any eligible employee who takes
leave under section 2612 of this title for the intended purpose of the leave
shall be entitled, on return from such leave (A)to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by
the employee when the leave commenced; or
(B)to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment
benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). Section 1615 reads in pertinent part:
§ 2615. Prohibited acts
(a) Interference with rights
(1) Exercise of rights
It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny
the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this
subchapter.
(2) Discrimination
It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful
by this subchapter.
(b) Interference with proceedings or inquiries.
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any individual because such individual(1) has filed any charge, or has instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding, under or related to this subchapter;
(2) has given, or is about to give, any information in connection with any
inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under this subchapter;
or
(3) has testified, or is about to testify, in an inquiry or proceeding relating
to any right provided under this subchapter.
29 U.S.C. § 2615. Section 2617 reads in pertinent part:
§ 2617. Enforcement
(a) Civil action by employees
(1) Liability
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However, what 'happens when a worker takes

FMLA leave and still loses his job? The FMLA eliminates the choice
between work and family, or medical obligations, only if the
provisions of the Act are enforced. There must be adequate recourse
for an employee whose statutory rights are violated.
To ensure that an employee's FMLA rights are safeguarded, the
Act protects an employee from interference with his FMLA rights
under § 2615(a)(1), from retaliation or discrimination under §
2615(a)(2), and from discrimination for participating in FMLA
proceedings under § 2615(b).9 Thus, a plaintiff-employee can proceed

under an interference theory and claim that the employment decision
in question interfered with his rights under the FMLA.1°
Alternatively, under the retaliation theory, the employee can allege
that his employer's decision was in response to his exercise of FMLA
rights."
In Potenza v. City of New York, 12 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit set forth a standard for evaluating an employee's13claim

that he was punished for exercising his rights under the FMLA. The
employee claimed that his employer terminated his employment after

Any employer who violates section 2615 of this title shall be liable to any
eligible employee affected (A) for the damages equal to(i) the amount of(I) any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied
or lost to such employee by reason of the violation; or
(II) in a case in which wages, salary, employment benefits, or other
compensation have not been denied or lost to the employee, any actual
monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation,
such as the cost of providing care, up to a sum equal to 12 weeks of wages or
salary for the employee;
(ii) the interest on the amount described in clause (i) calculated at the
prevailing rate; and
(iii) an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the
amount described in clause (i) and the interest described in clause (ii) ....
29 U.S.C. § 2617(a). Section 2654 states as follows:
§ 2654. Regulations
The Secretary of Labor shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to
carry out subchapter I of this chapter and this subchapter not later than 120
days after February 5, 1993.
29 U.S.C. § 2654.
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960-61
(10th Cir. 2002).
11. Some courts have distinguished between interference and retaliation claims
within § 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA. See, e.g., Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d
1008, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, the court analyzed the plaintiff's claim that she
was illegally denied reinstatement as a retaliation claim. See id. For further discussion
on distinguishing between interference and retaliation claims, see infra notes 66-67,
113-22, 215-19, 231-33 and accompanying text.
12. 365 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2004).
13. Id. at 167.
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he took leave under the FMLA. 4 Although the court established a

standard for reviewing FMLA claims, the short opinion illustrates the
confusion the circuits face in deciding these claims. The plaintiff,
Potenza, worked for the Department of Transportation at the Staten
Island Ferry and received many positive performance reports during

his employment.15 Potenza took a one month medical leave to have
knee surgery and was removed from his position as port engineer
approximately two months after his return to work. 16 Potenza alleged
that his employer made this decision because of Potenza's absence
under the FMLA.' 7

The Second Circuit analyzed the case under § 2615(a)(1) 8 of the
FMLA and classified the issue as a retaliation, rather than an

interference claim.' 9 The court proceeded to apply a burden-shifting2
framework that originated with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 1
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 166.
Id.
Id.; id. at 168.
Id. at 168.

18. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000).

"It shall be unlawful for any employer to

interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right
provided under this subchapter." Id.
19. The distinction between retaliation and interference is important in
determining what the plaintiff needs to prove to establish his claim. Courts have held
that plaintiffs in an interference claim do not have to prove that their employer
intended to violate the FMLA. However, to establish retaliation, a plaintiff must be
able to prove the employer's intent. See Potenza, 365 F.3d at 168 (discussing the
Seventh Circuit's approach of distinguishing between cases requiring proof of an
employer's intent and those cases that do not require such proof); infra notes 66-67,
113-22, 215-19, 231-33 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
interference and retaliation claims under the FMLA).
20. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court established a
framework for proving discrimination claims. Id. The importance of this case was that
it created a framework by which plaintiffs can prove discrimination based on
circumstantial evidence. See Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price
Waterhouse Standardand IndividualDisparate Treatment Law, 31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
859, 864 (2004). In many discrimination cases there is not much evidence of
discrimination; there are no incriminating documents or discriminatory statements.
Id.
Prior to McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs had great difficulty in proving
discrimination claims because of the "elusiveness" of proving, or disproving
discrimination. Id. The McDonnell Douglas formula helps the plaintiff prove
discriminatory intent. First, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Generally, the prima facie case
requires the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the
plaintiff was in a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for a job and applied
for it, (3) the employer rejected him, and (4) the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants. Id. This creates an inference of discrimination
that must be refuted by the employer. The employer must offer, but not prove that
there was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. See id. at
802-03. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the offered reason is
a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804-05. Courts have applied this framework to
Title VII cases to prove actual discrimination and retaliation. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (reaffirming the McDonnell Douglas
framework for a discriminatory treatment case under Title VII and applying the
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and was traditionally used in Title VII discrimination and retaliatory
charges." The Second Circuit held that, according to the McDonnell
Douglas framework, Potenza failed to establish the retaliatory intent
necessary to show his prima facie case. 2
While the Second Circuit attempted to clarify a standard for
evaluating FMLA claims, Potenza illustrates the overall confusion
regarding this area of the law. The court failed to articulate why the
plaintiff's claim under § 2615(a)(1), which prohibits interference with
FMLA rights, was analyzed as a retaliation claim, which requires
23
The
proof of intent under the McDonnel Douglas framework.
Second Circuit further neglected to recognize Potenza's right to take
FMLA leave and his entitlement to reinstatement. 24 Finally, the
Second Circuit failed to discuss the Department of Labor ("DOL")

analysis to a plaintiff's claim that the employer failed to promote her and discharged
her because of her sex in violation of Title VII); William R. Corbett, Of Babies,
Bathwater, and Throwing Out ProofStructures: It Is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell
Douglas, 2 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 361, 363 (1998) (discussing how the McDonnell
Douglas analysis is the "predominant method for analyzing intentional employment
discrimination claims"). For an example of applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis
to a retaliation claim under Title VII, see Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070-71
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding that once an employee establishes a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas
formula, and then back to the employee, leaving the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the plaintiff). Additionally, courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas formula to
discrimination claims under other federal employment statutes, such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). See, e.g.,
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-42 (2000) (assuming
arguendo that the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable to ADEA cases
based on various courts of appeals decisions). The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the agency that enforces the federal employment discrimination laws,
considers the McDonnell Douglas proof structure applicable to claims under Title
VII, the ADEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Corbett, supra, at 363 n.13.
21. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). It is also
an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against an employee who has
opposed a practice that is unlawful under the Act or who has participated in any
proceedings under the Act. Section 2000e-3 provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for
an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization
to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership,
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
22. Potenza, 365 F.3d at 168.
23. See id. at 165.
24. See id.
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regulations, which were implemented to carry out the FMLA

provisions.
This Note highlights the areas of confusion that exist in the current
FMLA jurisprudence and offers a framework to analyze FMLA

claims that better reflects the policies behind Congress's passage of
the FMLA. Part I outlines the different approaches used by the
federal courts. It also discusses the manner in which work-family
issues have supported tort claims against employers for wrongful
termination and how these issues are analyzed in arbitration. Part II

describes the advantages and disadvantages associated with the
different analyses of FMLA claims by the various federal jurisdictions.
Part II also evaluates the methods used to address the FMLA and

work-family leave in other forums, both as a tort for wrongful
discharge and in arbitration. Part III offers a new standard for
evaluating allegations that a plaintiff suffered adverse consequences
for taking FMLA leave, which compiles various elements from the

current jurisprudence, as well as the alternative forums.
framework ensures the job stability that the FMLA requires.26

This

25. See id.
26. This Note focuses on FMLA claims where the plaintiff alleges that his
employer took an adverse employment action because the plaintiff used FMLA leave.
Thus, there are many areas regarding FMLA jurisprudence that are outside the scope
of this Note. Such issues include federalism and the extent of states' rights to
immunity. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power. Polycentric Interpretationof the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943, 1948-49 (2003) (using the FMLA to analyze the enforcement
model for Section 5 jurisprudence). Another issue is the extent to which paid family
leave exists and the interrelationship between paid leave and the FMLA. See, e.g.,
Anne Wells, Note, Paid Family Leave: Striking a Balance Between the Needs of
Employees and Employers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1067, 1069-77, 1091-92 (2004)
(discussing emerging trends in paid family leave and employers' fears similar to their
initial concerns with the FMLA). Another area of FMLA jurisprudence outside the
scope of this Note is the relationship between the FMLA and the ADA. See, e.g.,
Peggy R. Mastroianni & David K. Fram, The Family and Medical Leave Act and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Areas of Contrastand Overlap, 9 Lab. Law. 553, 55759 (1993) (differentiating the between the substantive protections for employees
under the two acts). Another issue regards employers right to deny leave to "key
employees." See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 15 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 17, 38-39 (2004)
(discussing how the key employee exception reinforces the view that taking leave is
inconsistent with commitment to work). Notice requirements before an employee
can take leave are also an area of FMLA jurisprudence outside the scope of this Note.
See, e.g., Richard Bales & Sarah Nefzger, Employer Notice Requirements Under the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 883, 884-85 (2002) (discussing the
vagueness of the notice requirement under the FMLA and the DOL regulations on
the issue). An additional issue not addressed by this Note concerns the benefits of the
FMLA's gender-neutral treatment to family leave or the disadvantages this has for
women. See, e.g., Grossman, supra (discussing how the FMLA focuses on equality but
has gendered outcomes); Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 44 Vill. L. Rev. 395, 396-97 (1999) (criticizing that the FMLA
reinforces stereotypes by treating family leave as an issue of accommodation for
women and failing to address the dual labor market); Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic
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I. THE POLICIES AND VARIOUS METHODS FOR DECIDING FMLA
CLAIMS

Since Congress passed the FMLA in 1993, there has been confusion
in the courts on how to address an employee's claim that he was
punished for exercising his FMLA rights. Different approaches to the
FMLA and work-family issues have developed in recent years. Part

I.A addresses the policies behind the FMLA and Congress's goals in
providing minimum leave and job security. Part I.B discusses the
various approaches the federal courts use to address FMLA claims.
Part I.C examines how the FMLA and work-family leave issues are
addressed both as common law tort claims and in arbitration.
A. Why Congress Passed the FMLA: The Policies Behind the Act

Congress passed the FMLA in an attempt to address the difficulty
workers encountered when trying to balance workplace and family
needs.27 The FMLA provides job security to employees who must be

absent from work for illness, caring for family members, or caring for
new babies. The need to provide parental leave for the birth of a child

and for addressing initial child care needs was a central motivation in
the passing of the FMLA.2 s Congress was also concerned with the

potential for family crisis if an employee fell ill and lost his job as a
Goods: Legal Understandings of Work, Parenthood, and Gender Equality in
ComparativePerspective, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 531, 570 (1993) (arguing the FMLA's gender
equality offers material benefits and could transform legal discourse from a focus on
discrimination).
27. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 16-17 (1993) (expressing concern that
employers have not addressed the changes in family structures). The House Report
discusses the increasing number of women in the workforce and the struggle that
families experience to provide emotional and physical support within this changing
workforce. Id. Women, who were traditionally the primary caretakers in the family,
are an important part of the current workforce. "[O]ur workplaces are still too often
modeled on the unrealistic and outmoded idea of workers unencumbered by family
responsibilities." Id. at 17. Congress wanted to pass legislation that recognized the
realities of family needs that all workers face. "The experiences of many of our
companies, as well as those of some of our global competitors, show that workplaces
that accommodate workers' family responsibilities have more productive employees.
Workers whose family needs are accommodated at the workplace are more likely to
stay, and to be productive in their jobs." Id. At least one student commentator
suggests that the provisions that guaranteed rights to workers with serious health
conditions other than pregnancy came on the "coattails" of the pregnancy-related
leave. See Sabra Craig, Note, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Survey of
the Act's History, Purposes,Provisions,and Social Ramifications, 44 Drake L. Rev. 51,
57 (1995).
28. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 12-13 (discussing the inadequacy of parental
leave for pregnancy in the United States as compared to other countries). Dr. Sheila
Kamerman, of Columbia University School of Social Work, reported that "[a]ll
Western and Eastern European countries require employers to grant [parental]
leave.., and all provide for a period of leave longer than that proposed [in this Act]."
Id. at 12. The House Report cites expert testimony that indicates twelve weeks is the
minimum time needed for a parent and child to get used to each other. Id.
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result of illness.2 9 Another significant motivation was to address
employees' needs to care for a sick family member, including parents

or children.3" These policy objectives behind the FMLA can be
achieved only if the job security provisions are effective.31

To address these concerns, the FMLA gives an employee up to

twelve weeks of leave each year for a family or medical need32 and
guarantees the employee reinstatement to his former, or equivalent,
position if he chooses to exercise his leave rights.33 In order to attain

these goals, the FMLA prohibits any employer from interfering with,
restraining, or denying an employee the right to exercise, or an
attempt to exercise, a FMLA right.34 It also prevents employers from
discharging or discriminating against any individual for opposing any
practice that is unlawful under the FMLA.35 The FMLA also has an

antidiscrimination provision that prohibits discrimination against any
individual who has filed a charge or instituted any proceeding under
the Act.36
Congress modeled the FMLA after other federal labor standards
that addressed problems citizens were facing and employers were not
29. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 24 (assessing the "devastating consequences"
the loss of a job can have on an ill worker and his family). While the House Report
acknowledged that a worker and his family have always had difficulties when a
worker lost his job for medical reasons, the problems are exacerbated today because
of the "dramatic rise in single heads of household who are predominantly women
workers in low-paid jobs." Id.; see also Craig, supra note 27, at 57-58 (discussing
testimony in the House Report of workers who needed medical leave for themselves
or to care for a family member and the hardships they suffered without this leave).
30. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 23-24 (acknowledging that it is increasingly
common for the primary caregiver of a sick or aging individual to be a spouse or
parent); see also Comm'n of Family and Med. Leave, A Workable Balance: Report
to Congress on Family and Medical Leave Policies 9-10 (1996) [hereinafter A
Workable Balance] (citing statistics indicating that many workers take time off to care
for older relatives and spouses and predicting that number to rise as the population
ages); supra notes 1-7 (describing testimony of workers forced to choose between
their jobs and their family obligations to care for their children or parents).
31. See Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understandingof the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1995) (stating that the "essence of the
FMLA is the concept of job security:
employees may attend to familial
responsibilities confident that their employment is secure").
32. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2000).
33. Id. § 2614(a).
34. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
35. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
36. Id. § 2615(b). Courts and commentators have described allegations under §
2615(a)(1) as interference claims and charges under § 2615(a)(2) and (b) as retaliation
and discrimination claims. Some courts have distinguished between interference and
retaliation claims within § 2615(a)(1) as well. See, e.g., Potenza v. City of New York,
365 F.3d 165, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2004); Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 101718 (7th Cir. 2000). The distinction between an interference and retaliation claim
proves important to the determination of what constitutes the plaintiff's case.
Classifying the claim is a large source of the confusion with these FMLA claims. For
further discussion on the distinction between interference and retaliation claims, see
infra notes 66-67, 113-22, 215-19, 231-33 and accompanying text.
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addressing.37 Similar to child labor laws,38 the minimum wage, 9 Social
Security,4" the safety and health laws,4 1 the pensions and welfare

37. Emplovers provided inadecuate family and medical leave and thus Congress
needed to act to provide minimum standards. This decision is consistent with
congressional decisions to pass other federal labor standards. The House Report
describes the FMLA's similarity to other federal labor laws in that the FMLA, like
these other pieces of legislation, were responses to "specific problems with broad
implications." See H.R. Rev. No. 103-8, vt. 1. at 22 (1993).
There is a common set of principles underlying these labor standards. In
each instance, a Federal labor standard directly addressed a serious societal
vroblem, such as the exvloitation of child labor, or the exposure of workers
to unsafe working conditions. Voluntarv corrective actions on the part of
emplovers had vroven inadequate, with experience failing to substantiate
the claim that. left alone, all emplovers would act resvonsiblv. Finallv, each
law was enacted with the needs of emplovers in mind. Care was taken to
establish standards that emplovers could meet.
It is a minority of emvlovers who act irresvonsiblv. Even without
minimum standards most emplovers would pav a living wave. take steps to
protect the health and safety of their work force, and offer their emplovees
decent benefits. A central reason that labor standards are necessary is to
relieve the competitive pressure placed on resvonsible emplovers bv
emplovers who act irresponsiblv. Federal labor standards take broad societal
concerns out of the competitive vrocess so that conscientious emplovers are
not
forced
to
compete
with
unscrupulous
emplovers.
The FMLA was drafted with these principles in mind and fits souarelv
within the tradition of the labor standards laws that have preceded it. In the
past. Congress has responded to chaning economic realities bv enacting
labor standards that are now widelv accepted. In drawing on this tradition.
the FMLA vroposes a minimum labor standard to address significant new
developments in today's workplace.
Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 (noting
that employers "failed to adequately respond to recent economic and social changes
that have intensified the tensions between work and family"); Rigler, supra note 31, at
461.
38. See § 212 (prohibiting employers from using "oppressive child labor" in the
production, manufacturing, or dealing of goods in interstate commerce). "Children
worked for long hours, under unsafe conditions, before the child labor laws were
enacted." H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 22. As with the child labor laws, Congress
passed the FMLA to address social concerns and help families deal with the burdens
of work.
39. See § 206 (establishing a minimum hourly wage rate with which employers
engaging in commerce or production of goods for commerce must comply). "The
minimum wage was enacted because of the societal interest in preventing the
payment of exploitative wages." H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 22. The FMLA, like
minimum wage laws, was passed to provide a minimum standard that Congress
deemed necessary for society.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2000) (providing insurance benefits to those over 62).
"The Social Security Act was based on the belief that workers should be assured a
minimum pension at retirement." H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 22. Similarly, the
FMLA ensures minimum leave for family and medical needs.
41. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (obligating employers to follow federally mandated
occupational health and safety standards). Congress intended to provide "every
working man and woman ... healthful working conditions" through new procedures
and mandatory occupational safety and health standards. Id. § 651(b). Congress was
similarly concerned with the health and welfare of employees in passing the FMLA.
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benefit laws,42 and other labor laws that establish minimum standards

for employment,43 the FMLA provides a minimum labor standard for
leave.

Like the mentioned labor standards, the FMLA provides a

floor that employers must meet.44 However, states or employers could
choose to provide greater benefits than those that are mandated by
the FMLA.45
Pursuant to the statutory language, the DOL established extensive
regulations to implement and enforce the FMLA, including a

description of the employees and employers covered by the Act and
an explanation of employers' responsibilities under the FMLA. 46 The
to judicial deference in the
DOL regulations are entitled
47
interpretation of FMLA issues.

42. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Pub.
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)
(providing minimum standards to ensure "the equitable character" of pension plans).
Congress recognized the growth of employee benefits plans and that the economic
well-being of many workers was directly affected by these plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
In the same way, Congress was concerned with the needs of workers, especially given
the changes in the working population, when it created the FMLA. See supra notes
27, 29-30 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4304, 43114319, 4321-4326, 4331-4333 (2000).
To address concerns about the emplovment rights of returning veterans,
Congress enacted a labor standard that is directly analogous to [the FMLA.
The Veterans' Reemplovment Rights Act, enacted in 1940. provides up to
four vears of iob security to workers called to military dutv (including
Reservists and National Guard personnel called to active or inactive duty for
training of drills). Returning workers as entitled to reinstatement to their
previous job with full retention of seniority, status, pay, and any other
benefits.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 22.
44. H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 22; S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 (noting that the FMLA "accommodates the important societal
interest in assisting families, by establishing a minimum labor standard for leave"); see
also Rigler, supra note 31, at 461.
45. See H.R. Rep No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 23 (discussing that employers have the
discretion to award an employee more than twelve weeks of unpaid leave).
46. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100-825.118, 825.200-825.220, 825.300-825.312, 825.400825.404, 825.500, 825.600-825.604, 825.700-825.702, 825.800 (2004). The Secretary of
Labor is charged with prescribing regulations for the implementation of the FMLA.
29 U.S.C. § 2654. The Wage and Hour Division of the Department is responsible for
ensuring that employers comply with the Act. See A Workable Balance, supra note
30, at 85.
47. When Congress statutorily authorizes an agency to implement and enforce a
statute, the Supreme Court has held that agency interpretations of silent, ambiguous
statutes are entitled to due deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Provided that the agency's interpretation of the
statute is permissible and reasonable, the courts should follow the agency
interpretation. See id. at 843-44. However, the agency's interpretation must be
consistent with Congress's intent, as demonstrated by the statute and legislative
history. See id. at 844; accord Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 833 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that DOL regulations are entitled to deference but courts should not
"rubber stamp[] regulations that are 'inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that
frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute"' (internal citations omitted)).
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Congress passed the FMLA to provide minimum leave for workers
and to afford them the job security to attend to their medical and

family obligations. Employers covered by the statute are required to
provide the federally mandated leave and their employees have a

guaranteed right to reinstatement following that leave.48 When this
process breaks down, the courts step in to ensure compliance with the
FMLA.
B. Trouble After Employees Take FMLA Leave: The FederalCourts'
Approaches

There has been much confusion among the federal circuit courts on
how to decide a case in which a plaintiff alleges that his employer took
a negative employment action against him in response to his taking
FMLA leave. There is substantial litigation in which an employee has
taken FMLA leave and is either discharged during, or shortly after, he
returns to work. Three areas where courts have differed and which
have created a circuit split on how a plaintiff can prove his allegations

that his employer violated the FMLA are: (1) how to designate a
plaintiff's claim; (2) how to allocate the burden of proof with regard to
this claim; and (3) how to use the DOL regulations in deciding the
case. This part discusses the federal courts' approaches for addressing
these issues under the FMLA.
1. Applying the McDonnell Douglas Framework
Several courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to
analyze allegations of a FMLA violation when an employer imposes
an adverse employment decision against an employee who is on
medical leave, or shortly after his return to work. 9 The McDonnell
Douglas formula5" is a burden-shifting approach that the U.S.

Supreme

Court

developed

in

the

context

of

employment

The extent to which the courts should defer to the DOL regulations is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a discussion of the application of Chevron deference to the
DOL regulations on the FMLA, see Caitlyn M. Campbell, Note, Overstepping One's
Bounds: The Department of Labor and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 84 B.U. L.

Rev. 1077, 1078 (2004) (arguing that DOL regulations regarding the definition of
"serious health condition," employers designation of FMLA leave, and notice
requirements, violate congressional intent and thus are not entitled to Chevron
deference).
48. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2004); Brungart
v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 231 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2000); Chaffin v. John H. Carter
Co., 179 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999).
50. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme
Court created this formula to analyze discrimination claims. It ensures that the
plaintiff has the burden to prove that the employment decision in question was
because of discrimination in violation of a federal statute. See supra note 20.
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discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.51

Under this approach, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof during
the entire litigation.52 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case that he was subjected to discrimination.

3

The employer then

must introduce evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

his employment decision.5 4 The burden then shifts back to the
employee to prove that the employer's offered reason was, in fact,

pretext for the discriminatory reason.55

The Seventh Circuit in Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., illustrates the
use of the McDonnell Douglas approach in the context of a claim that

51. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, national origin, gender, or religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). It also
prohibits retaliation against an employee who opposed a Title VII violation or
participated in any Title VII investigative proceedings. Id. § 2000e-3. For a discussion
of the development of the McDonnell Douglas framework in Title VII and other
federal antidiscrimination laws jurisprudence, see generally Corbett, supra note 20.
52. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(emphasizing that under McDonnell Douglas the "ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff" (emphasis added)).
53. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court held that the plaintiff could
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the issue in that case, by showing
that:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications.
Id. "The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not
onerous." Burdine,450 U.S. at 253. The prima facie case serves to eliminate the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision. Id. at 254.
54. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803 (holding that an employer can refuse to
hire a person who has engaged in unlawful activity against him). The employer does
not have to prove that the reason offered was in fact the actual reason for the
decision, but rather just needs to provide some evidence that he had a nondiscriminatory reason. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (describing that the employers
burden is not to persuade the court that their proferred reasons were the actual
motivation, but to produce enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to
whether there was discrimination against the plaintiff). Courts have found various
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons to satisfy the employer's burden. See e.g.,
Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2004) (maintaining
that an employer may rebut the presumption of discrimination by demonstrating that
the person promoted was better qualified than the plaintiff); Mayfield v. Patterson
Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the employer's burden
was satisfied by articulating incompetence, inefficiency, and failing to meet
production standards as grounds for termination); Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d
1130, 1133 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the employer's explanation for terminating an
employee based on its belief that the plaintiff carried a weapon, satisfied the
employer's burden).
55. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The plaintiff has the burden to prove
that the offered reason was not the actual reason for the employment decision. This
burden "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been
the victim of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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an employee was terminated in violation of the FMLA.56 In Rice, the
employee, Rice, had surgery which necessitated her to take a leave for
four weeks. Two days after Rice informed her employer of her intent
to return, her employer terminated her employment. Her layoff
became effective the day she intended to return to work.57 The court
described the "two categories of broad protections for employees"
separate substantive rights and proscriptive
under the FMLA:
8
rights. In analyzing what Rice needed to show to prove that her
employer violated her FMLA rights, the court applied the McDonnell
Douglas framework of shifting the burden. The court held that Rice's
allegations fell into the proscriptive provisions of the FMLA and thus,
the employee always bears the ultimate burden of establishing the
right to the benefit she claims she was illegally denied, which in Rice
was the right to reinstatement.5 9 The employer could bring forth
evidence that the benefit would not have been available even if the
employee did not take leave; but ultimately, the employee must show
that the benefit is one that the employee would have received if he
had not taken FMLA leave.60
2. The Ninth Circuit Approach: The Negative Factor Test
The Ninth Circuit has rejected the McDonnell Douglas approach
and applied a different analysis to FMLA claims. The Ninth Circuit
established its approach in Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc.61
56. Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2000).
57. Id. at 1011.
58. Id. at 1016-17; see also King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891
(7th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit defines the substantive provisions as the right to
take unpaid leave for up to twelve weeks in any twelve month period under § 2612(a),
and the right to reinstatement under § 2614(a), and states that it is unlawful for any
employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of FMLA rights under §
2615(a)(1). Id. If an employee is alleging a denial of these guarantees, he would have
to show an entitlement to the disputed leave by the preponderance of the evidence
and employer's intent is immaterial. Id. However, when an employee raises the issue
whether the employer discriminated against an employee for exercising FMLA rights,
intent is relevant. Id. The Seventh Circuit explained that these issues fell under the
proscriptive provisions of the FMLA and are described as analogous to actions for
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Id.
59. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1017-18.
60. Id. at 1018. The Seventh Circuit provided an example of how to apply the
burden-shifting framework in the context of the FMLA:
[I]f the employer claims that the employee would have been discharged or
that the employee's position would have been eliminated even if the
employee had not taken the leave, the employee, in order to establish the
entitlement protected by § 2614(a)(1), must, in the course of establishing the
right, convince the trier of fact that the contrary evidence submitted by the
employer is insufficient and that the employee would not have been
discharged or his position would not have been eliminated if he had not
taken FMLA leave.
Id.
61. 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
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There, an employee had taken FMLA leave in 1994 and 1995. In
1996, a manager discussed Bachelder's attendance record with her.
Among the absences discussed were her FMLA leaves. Bachelder's

employer fired her in April of 1996 for her sixteen absences, following
that discussion with management. 62

Bachelder alleged that the

FMLA-protected leaves were factors used in the employment
decision. The Ninth Circuit emphasized the DOL regulations, which

explain that the prohibition of employer interference with the exercise
of FMLA rights means that employers cannot use FMLA leave as a
negative factor in employment decisions.63
The Ninth Circuit also found that the FMLA's language on

interference mimics the language in section 8(a)(1) of the National

Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 4 and, therefore, the NLRA can be
used to clarify the FMLA provision prohibiting interference with an
Thus, the Ninth Circuit read the
employee's FMLA rights.65

"interference" or "restraint" provision of the FMLA to cover
employer actions that deter participation in protected activities, which
would include termination or adverse actions taken because the
employee used the FMLA leave.66 The court held that Bachelder's
claim did not fall within the antidiscrimination provision found in §
2615(a)(2) or the anti-retaliation provision of § 2615(b) which, by
62. Id. at 1121.
63. Id. at 1122 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.2 2 0 (c) (2004)). Regulation 825.220(c)
provides in part, "employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative
factor in employment actions." Id. § 825.220(c).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). Section 8 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158) provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
Id. § 158(a).
65. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1123. The Ninth Circuit refers to several decisions
under the NLRA where courts have held that activities such as threatening job loss,
awarding preferential rights to strike replacements, and surveillance of union
organizing constitute interference with employees' NLRA rights. See id. Under the
NLRA, activity that reasonably tends to interfere with an employee's exercise of
protected activity violates section 8(a)(1). NLRB v. Hitchiner Mfg. Co., 634 F.2d
1110, 1113 (8th Cir. 1980); see also United States Auto. Ass'n v. NLRB, 387 F.3d 908,
913 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the National Labor Relations Board does not have
to find that the employer's language or acts were "coercive in actual fact" but that
they had the "tendency to coerce" (internal citations omitted)); NLRB v.
Transpersonnel, Inc., 349 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the section
8(a)(1) inquiry is whether the conduct had a "reasonable tendency in the totality of
circumstances to intimidate" (internal citations omitted)); NLRB v. Ill. Tool Works,
153 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1946) (holding that the test to determine if there is a
section 8(a)(1) violation does not depend on the employer's motivations but rather
whether the employer engaged in conduct that may reasonably be said to "interfere
with the free exercise" of employees' rights). In analyzing allegations under section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA, courts and the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")
objectively balance the competing employee and employer interests. See Martin H.
Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 7
Employee Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 329, 370 (2003).
66. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.
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their plain meaning, do not cover situations in which employees
suffered negative consequences for using FMLA leave.67 After
determining that the claim should be considered under the
interference provision of the FMLA, the court explained the
appropriate standard for a plaintiff to prove the FMLA violation: The
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her
taking FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the
decision to terminate her.68
3. The Tenth Circuit Approach: Employer Carries the Burden
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the burden-shifting analysis for an
allegation that taking FMLA leave resulted in the denial of
employment benefits.

In Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln, Smith took

FMLA leave for breast cancer treatment.69 While she was on leave,
her employer found that she did not adequately train her junior
employees, and she was terminated while still on leave.7" Smith
proceeded under § 2615(a)(1) based on the interference or
entitlement theory; she alleged that her employer violated the
interference provisions of the FMLA because she would not have
been terminated if she was not on leave.71 The Tenth Circuit held that
a plaintiff can prevail under an entitlement theory if the plaintiff can
prove that she was denied her substantive FMLA rights for a reason
connected with her leave.72 The court went on to say that this reason
is not necessarily retaliation and, therefore, Smith was able to prove
an
under
the FMLA
violated
termination
that her
interference/entitlement theory.73
In allocating the burden of proof with an entitlement claim, the
Tenth Circuit held that the proper approach is to shift the burden to
the employer to prove that the employee would have been dismissed
regardless of his requesting or taking the leave.74 The Tenth Circuit
found that this framework was consistent with the DOL regulations.75
67. Id. at 1124-25.
68. Id. at 1125. The court held that the plaintiff can prove this claim using either
direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.
69. Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 959 (10th Cir. 2002).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 960-61.
72. Id. at 960.
73. Id. at 961.
74. Id. at 963.
75. The Tenth Circuit relied on DOL regulation 825.216(a)(1) stating: "An
employer must be able to show that an employee would not otherwise have been
employed at the time reinstatement is requested in order to deny restoration to
employment" and "if an employee is laid off during the course of taking FMLA
leave.... An employer would have the burden of proving that an employee would
have been laid off during the FMLA leave period and, therefore would not be entitled
to restoration." Id.; see also O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d
1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employer has the opportunity to show
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The court held that the regulation was not "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the FMLA" and therefore was entitled to
deference.76 Thus, the burden of proof should be shifted to the
employer, as required by the DOL regulations.
C. Addressing the FMLA and Work-Family Leave in Other Forums
Most claims of FMLA violations are heard in federal courts.
However, claimants sometimes bring actions for violations related to
family and medical leave in other forums. One alternative method for77
adjudicating FMLA claims is to proceed in employment arbitration.
Employment conflicts are increasingly pursued in an arbitral forum.78
Thus, many actual FMLA claims are decided in arbitration rather
than the traditional court forum. Even more frequently, arbitrators
are faced with disciplinary cases in which an employee's family and
medical needs are central to the decision. 79 Alternatively, plaintiffs
occasionally choose to pursue a wrongful termination claim as a tort,
rather than proceed under the FMLA.80 For example, while the
general rule in employment relationships is employment-at-will,8 1
plaintiffs have attempted to bring tort claims against employers for
their wrongful termination. These examples provide alternative ways
to look at the FMLA and related work-family issues. Part I.C first
looks at the use of wrongful termination claims to address family and
medical leave issues and then examines the way these issues are
addressed in arbitration.
1. Termination for Taking Family and Medical Leave: Wrongful
Termination Claim
While employment-at-will is the general rule, some courts have
recognized an exception if the termination is found to be a violation of
public policy. Generally, violations of public policy fall into two
categories: (1) an employee is required to perform an illegal act and,
upon objecting, is terminated; or (2) an employee asserts his legal

that he would have discharged the employee had he not been on leave, consistent
with regulation 825.216).
76. Smith, 298 F.3d at 963.
77. See, e.g., Stewart v. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, L.L.P., 201 F. Supp. 2d
291, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (concluding that FMLA claim could be decided in
arbitration based on arbitration agreement to which plaintiff voluntarily agreed after
she had opportunity to consult counsel).
78. See infra notes 94-95, 190 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
81. The doctrine of employment-at-will allows an employer to terminate an
employee with or without cause at any time and the employee has an equal right to
quit for any reason. Thus either party can terminate the employment relationship
without cause.
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rights and is terminated for doing SO.8 2 Most states recognize wrongful
termination in violation of public policy as constituting a tort
To
independent of the at-will employment contract defense.83
establish a claim based on a violation of public policy, the policy must
be: (1) supported by a constitutional or statutory provision; (2) for
the benefit of the public rather than specific interest of the individual;
(3) articulated at the time of discharge; and (4) the policy must be
fundamental.' Some courts have applied this analysis to find that an
employee can state a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on
a violation of the FMLA.85
When recognized, the tort constitutes a separate claim against an
employer for violating the FMLA. For example, the California Court
of Appeals in Nelson v. United Technologies held that a violation of
the California state counterpart to the FMLA supported a public
policy wrongful discharge claim."s In support of this finding, the court
focused on the policies that the statute explicitly codified. The leave
policy was stated within the statutory provision with a detailed
description of employers' obligations.8 7 Furthermore, the policies
behind the statute benefit the public at large because they aim to
promote economic security and stability in families.88 The policies and
statute were implemented and well established by the time the
employer in the case made the employment decision at issue.89
Finally, promoting stability and economic security in families is a
fundamental and substantial policy.90
For courts to recognize a tort based on a violation of the FMLA,
the courts must first find that the FMLA does not completely preempt
the cause of action. Courts that have recognized the tort have found
that there is no evidence that Congress intended the FMLA to
completely preempt common law claims or that there would be any
conflict between the FMLA and a wrongful discharge claim.9 1 The
82. Diana P. Scott, Emerging Trends in State Law Employment Claims, 2004
Current Developments in Emp., AL.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, at 487.
83. Id.
84. Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Stevenson
v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157 (Cal. 1997)).
85. See id. at 1138; see also Nelson v. United Techs., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 239, 245 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a violation of CFRA (state counterpart to FMLA) is a
violation of public policy). The court emphasized in Nelson the need for family leave
without fear of job loss, the broad implementation of the law, and the substantial and
fundamental aspects of the law. Id. at 246-48.
86. Nelson, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245.
87. Id. at 246.
88. Id. at 246-47.
89. Id. at 247.
90. Id. at 247-48. The court referred to the federal FMLA and various states that
have implemented family and medical leave legislation to support its finding that
there are important policies behind the California legislation. Id.
91. Danfelt v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 998 F. Supp. 606, 611 (D. Md. 1998)
(discussing that a federal law completely preempts state law when Congress "evinces
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FMLA provides

minimum

if state

protection

and, therefore,

legislation offers greater benefits and protections, employers in that
state are required to abide by the state statutory provisions as well as
the FMLA.92 However, some courts have held that the FMLA is the
exclusive remedy and refuse to recognize a tort claim.93
2. Arbitration of the FMLA and Other Work-Family Issues

Like a tort action for wrongful termination, arbitration provides
claimants with another alternative to federal courts for FMLA claims.
Arbitration has become an increasingly popular forum to resolve
employment disputes, including statutory claims. 94 Frequently, the
FMLA is incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement such
that the claims are decided in arbitration pursuant to the bargaining

agreement. 95 Not all FMLA claims, however, are required to go to
arbitration absent clear contractual language.96 Regardless of whether
the claims are required to be resolved in arbitration under a contract,
arbitrators are frequently required to address grievances that deal

with the struggle to balance family and employment needs. Conflicts
between workers and management often lead to disputes in which

an intent to occupy completely a given field"). Arguably, Congress did not intend to
"occupy completely" based on the legislative history that the FMLA was intended to
act as a minimum labor standard. The House Reports discussed with approval how
various states have enacted their own family and medical leave. See, e.g., H.R. Rep.
No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 32-33 (1993).
92. Rigler, supra note 31, at 493.
93. See, e.g., Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 773 N.E.2d 526, 533-34 (Ohio 2002)
(discussing the adequacy of the recourse available for employees under the provisions
of the FMLA and declining to recognize a tort claim); see also infra note 189 and
accompanying text.
94. Arbitration of an employee's statutory claim can occur if: (1) the employee is
covered by a collective bargaining agreement which requires just cause or good cause
for dismissal and the employee claims that the discriminatory reason violates this
provision; or (2) an individual employee signs a form that they will submit all
workplace disputes to an arbitration system. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing
Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 Ind. L.J. 83, 84 (2001). This latter category, non-union
agreements to arbitrate, became increasingly popular in the 1980s and 1990s. Id. at 8384.
95. See, e.g., Electrolux Home Prods., Inc. v. United Auto. Workers of Am., Local
442, 343 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (holding that the collective bargaining
agreement incorporated the FMLA by referring to the Act in the agreement).
96. See Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the
employer could not compel plaintiff to arbitrate federal statutory claim under the
FMLA because the collective bargaining agreement, which required arbitration, did
not explicitly provide for all federal claims to be submitted to arbitration and the
broad provisions in the contract did not sufficiently incorporate the antidiscrimination
requirements). But see Butler Mfg. Co. v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.3d 629, 633 (7th
Cir. 2003) (holding the arbitrator had authority to take the FMLA into account when
the collective bargaining agreement required that employment opportunities were
offered in "accordance with the provisions of law").
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arbitrators must determine whether the employer had just cause 97 to
discipline an employee for refusing management directives because of
child care or other family obligations, or whether the employer should
have accommodated the employee's needs.98
As arbitration resolves more employment disputes, the issues of
how to handle family and medical leave are increasingly necessary to

address.

Because arbitrations often arise as a requirement of an

employment contract, arbitrators are often called upon to interpret
the terms of the agreement. In following contractual language,
arbitrators have upheld employees' grievances when the employment

contract provided that the employer must give leave for reasonable
cause. 99 However, sometimes when arbitrators strictly follow the
contractual language or past practices it results in harsh outcomes and
little consideration of the family's needs.'0°

Frequently, arbitrators address whether the employer terminated an
employee for just cause as required by the employment contract. Just

cause is usually viewed in a framework of what a reasonable man
might have done under similar circumstances. Thus, "arbitrators have
made it easier for employees to harmonize their work and family

responsibilities by recognizing that principles of just cause require
employers to respond reasonably to employees' needs to care for their

children."'' 1 Therefore, if an employer terminates an employee for
taking leave, an arbitrator will determine whether it was reasonable
for the employee to request that leave. If the request was reasonable,

the arbitrator might find that there was no just cause for the
termination. 2 Alternatively, an arbitrator might accept family

97. Whether an employer had just cause to terminate or discipline an employee is
evaluated on a case-by-case basis; there is no precise definition of what constitutes
just cause. However, the employer's decisions cannot be arbitrary and must be
objectively reasonable. See 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee § 60 (1992).
98. See Benjamin Wolkinson & Russell Ormiston, The Reconciliation of WorkFamily Conflicts in Arbitration,59 Disp. Resol. J. 84, 86 (2004).
99. In Ironworkers Local 473, the arbitrator held that the grievant should not have
been disciplined by the "no-fault" attendance policy when she missed work to care for
her sick child. The arbitrator concluded that a leave of absence should have been
granted because of the contractual requirement that leave is given for "reasonable
cause" and having a sick child was a reasonable basis for the request. Iron Workers
5533 (1999) (Eglit,
Local 473 v. Filtran Division, SPX Corp., 99-1 Arb, (CCH)
Arb.); see also Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98, at 88.
100. Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98, at 93-94 (noting that arbitrators
sometimes ignore the discretionary authority they possess). Benjamin Wolkinson and
Russell Ormiston argue, however, that in most reported cases the arbitrators
recognize the difficulties of family needs. Id. Thus, arbitrators may reduce or
overturn discipline where an absence was caused by emergency medical situations
involving an employee's children. Id. at 94.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 89.
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concerns as mitigating or exonerating factors which warrant a lesser
discipline." 3
When the contract language is not clear or the past practice of the
employer is not evident, arbitrators may look to other factors in
deciding an issue regarding family and medical leave. Arbitrators
hold parties to a duty to act responsibly. Thus, an arbitrator
sometimes is not sympathetic to an employee who cannot get a
babysitter for his child,"° but other times the arbitrator will recognize
the difficulties of providing child care. 5 Furthermore, arbitrators
might take into account the employee's cumulative attendance record.
Generally, if the employee had a good attendance record, the
arbitrator is more likely to consider child care needs as a mitigating
factor. Finally, an arbitrator might be sympathetic to an employee
who refuses to work overtime if they have a reasonable excuse, such
as caring for children,10 6 but they might be less sympathetic if the
employer is confronted with operational constraints. 7 Arbitrators

103. Id. at 88 (referring to factors that could impact an arbitrator's determination,
including "(1) the duty of employers and employees to act responsibly, (2) the
grievant's overall attendance record, (3) emergency medical situations, and (4) the
operational needs of the employer").
104. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am. Local 1013, 95 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 610 (1990) (Das & Dybek, Arbs.). In that situation the arbitration
panel upheld a fifteen day suspension when the grievant could not find a babysitter to
replace the one that cancelled at 10pm the night before the grievant's shift. Id. at 613.
The panel found the grievant did not do anything to try to make other arrangements;
he could not "wash his hands of the entire matter by simply saying, as he in effect did,
that he is too busy to exercise any responsibility for arranging for child care." Id.; see
also Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98, at 90.
105. See, e.g., Tenneco Packaging v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 231,
112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 761 (1999) (Kessler, Arb.). Arbitrator Frederick P.
Kessler reversed the termination of a grievant who did not report to a Saturday
overtime shift when the caretaker could not care for grievant's seventeen-year-old
disabled son. Id. at 768. The arbitrator took into account the difficulties of acting as
single parent for a disabled child, that the grievant was required to work on Saturday
which is usually not a work day, and that the grievant was a long term employee. Id.;
see also Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98, at 90-91.
106. Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98, at 93 (citing Keebler Co., 03-1 Arb.
3481 (2003), where the arbitrator overturned attendance points against grievant who
refused to work overtime because he needed to take his young daughter to the
doctor).
107. If the employer is responsible for public safety, such as a police department,
the arbitrator is likely to be more concerned with the employer's staffing needs to
ensure that they can adequately perform their safety duties. See, e.g., Town of
Stratford, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513 (1991) (Stewart, Arb.). In that case the
arbitrator upheld the suspension of an employee who was to report to work early to
fulfill manpower requirement but did not show up when she could not find a
babysitter for her young children under short notice. Id. The arbitrator emphasized
the employer's needs and the military-like organization of the department. Id. at 514;
see also Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98, at 93. Arbitrators are also likely to be
more deferential to an employer when the employee failed to provide notice of family
needs. Id.; see e.g., L. A. County Servs. Dep't, 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1079, 1082
(1989) (Knowlton, Arb.) (upholding discipline of an employee who failed to
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seem to recognize that an employee's family needs are often
reasonable and beyond the employee's control. However, arbitrators
also recognize that employers need reliable employees to adequately
run a business. Thus, arbitrators look at all relevant circumstances
and have used reasonable family needs to mitigate employers'
disciplinary decisions against employees.
Arbitrators and the courts have applied a variety of approaches to
FMLA issues. In all forums, there are inconsistent results on how to
address an employee's claim that he was illegally terminated or
disciplined based on his legitimate use of family or medical leave.
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with these
different approaches, which Part II examines.

II. PROTECTING EMPLOYEES AND ENFORCING THE FMLA's
GUARANTEE OF REINSTATEMENT-EVALUATING THE VARIOUS
APPROACHES
The right to reinstatement is central to affording workers the job
security that Congress intended the FMLA to provide for employees
who have family and health concerns. However, security and stability
can truly exist only if the FMLA's reinstatement provisions are
This part will examine how the various
adequately enforced.
approaches to FMLA claims address the areas of confusion under the
FMLA: classifying the claim, allocating the burden of proof, and the
courts' reliance on the DOL regulations.
Part II.A discusses applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to
FMLA claims. Parts II.B and II.C address and evaluate alternatives
to the McDonnell Douglas formula as applied by the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits. Part 1I.D focuses on FMLA claims in alternative forums.
First, it examines whether the public policies behind the FMLA could
support a wrongful termination claim. Second, it discusses whether
employment arbitration is an adequate alternative to litigation of
federal statutory claims like the FMLA.
A. Applying the McDonnell Douglas Framework to FMLA Claims
The McDonnell Douglas formula provides a structure for courts to
classify the FMLA claim, allocate the burden of proof, and determine
the extent to which the DOL regulations address the proof structure.
Part II.A discusses the framework that McDonnell Douglas provides
with regard to these issues.

accommodate the needs of her employer or request leave as soon as she recognized a
problem).
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1. Classifying the Claim: Interference, Retaliation, or
Discrimination?
The FMLA protects an employee from interference with his FMLA
rights under § 2615(a)(1), from retaliation or discrimination under §
2615(a)(2), and from discrimination for participating in FMLA
proceedings under § 2615(b). Thus, courts need to decide what claim
the plaintiff is bringing in alleging that his FMLA rights have been
violated.
Courts that have applied the burden-shifting analysis have found
that an employee's termination falls under the "proscriptive"
provisions of the FMLA.1 8 These courts have found that the
proscriptive provisions are based on the discrimination and retaliation
provisions under Title VII. 10 9 Thus, the courts analyze the claim as a
discrimination claim and apply the McDonnell Douglas formula. By
applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to both the FMLA and
Title VII retaliation claims, a court is applying a consistent framework
for all retaliation claims.11 The courts apply the same standard that is
used for Title VII retaliatory discharge claims to establish retaliatory
Furthermore, by following the McDonnell Douglas
intent.111
framework, a court ensures that the employee carries the burden to
show a violation of the FMLA." 2
However, commentators and courts have criticized equating a
plaintiff's allegation that he suffered adverse action because he took
FMLA leave with a discrimination claim similar to a Title VII charge.
First, courts and commentators disapprove of this approach for
confusing the § 2615(a)(1) interference claims with § 2615(a)(2) and §
2615(b) retaliation and discrimination claims." 3 Section 2615(a)(1)
has been compared to section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, rather than Title
It is well established that the ban on an employer's
VII." 4
interference with an employee's NLRA rights affords employees
108. See, e.g., King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999).
109. See supra note 58 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's distinction between the
substantive and proscriptive provisions of the FMLA).
110. See Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding
that "[n]othing in the FMLA landscape suggests that the teachings of McDonnell
Douglas would be less useful" for FMLA claims). The court held that "there is no
significant difference between such claims under the FMLA and similar claims under
other anti-discrimination laws." Id.
111. Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004).
112. See, e.g., Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000).
113. Malin, supra note 65, at 349 (distinguishing § 2615(a)(1) from § 2615(a)(2) and
(b)); see also Amy Stutzke, Note, Reinstatement Claims Under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993: Leaving Behind the Inter-Circuit Chaos and Instating a Suitable
Proof Structure, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 577, 593 (2004); supra notes 66-67 and
accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's distinction between interference
and retaliation claims).
114. Malin, supra note 65, at 349-50; see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's reliance on NLRA analysis).
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broader protections than the prohibition on discrimination.

1

Thus,

the courts should not read a discrimination requirement into FMLA
litigation." 6
A second criticism is that the distinction between the proscriptive

and substantive rights is unclear. The courts have not explained when
a claim that an employer took adverse employment action because of
the plaintiff-employee's use of FMLA leave should be considered

interference where the courts do not require proof of retaliatory
intent and retaliation, where intent is relevant.' 17 The courts are
drawing a "false dichotomy" from situations requiring discriminatory
intent and those where the courts decided no intent is required.11 s The

discrimination referred to in § 2615(a)(2) is not a general protection of
the exercise of FMLA rights, but rather a specific prohibition against
discrimination of an employee who opposes a practice that violates

the FMLA. 119 Some courts argue that only these specific activities
were intended to be covered by § 2615(a)(2) and could possibly be
analyzed with the McDonnell Douglas framework. 120 For example, if
an employee complained of an employer's policy that denied FMLA
leave and alleged that the employer made a detrimental employment
decision based on his complaint, the McDonnell Douglas formula

could apply.

However, in circumstances where the employment

decision was based on the employee's taking FMLA-protected leave,
it is a § 2615(a)(1) violation. 2' Classifying the claim as an alleged
violation of § 2615(a)(1) or § 2615(a)(2) has the impact of establishing
two drastically different ways to handle almost identical fact
situations. This problem is exacerbated by situations in which courts

115. Malin, supra note 65, at 349-50.
116. Id. at 353. Martin H. Malin argues that Congress modeled FMLA §
2615(a)(2) and (b) after the antidiscrimination provisions in Title VII but the
language related to discrimination is "conspicuously" absent from § 2615(a)(1). Id. at
357-58.
117. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
approach to distinguishing between claims that require proof of intent and those
which do not). The Seventh Circuit's approach, however, assumes that a claim of
adverse action for exercising a FMLA right should not be analyzed as a denial of a
substantive guarantee. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (contending that
these claims of adverse employment actions should be considered interference claims
without requiring proof of intent).
118. Malin, supra note 65, at 358 (describing the "false dichotomy" between
interference claims with no requirement of the proof of intent and retaliation claims
analyzed under McDonnell Douglas).
119. Malin contends that § 2615(a)(2) is modeled after the opposition clause of
Title VII which states that it is unlawful to discriminate against any employee who has
"opposed any practice, made an unlawful employment practice" by Title VII. Id. The
general protection of FMLA rights lies within § 2615(a)(1). Id. Malin argues that the
courts "turned an FMLA entitlement into a prohibition on discrimination." Id. at 362.
120. See supra text accompanying note 67.
121. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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use the McDonnell Douglas framework for the entire trial, instead of

122
only at the summary judgment phase.

2. The McDonnell Douglas Approach: Shifting the Burden with the
Ultimate Burden of Proof on the Plaintiff
Once the claim has been classified, courts proceed by applying the
McDonnell Douglas formula similar to the Title VII approach. 123 The

employee bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he was
entitled to an employment opportunity under the FMLA. The
employer's burden is to introduce evidence of a legal reason,
unrelated to the leave, for making the particular employment

decision.

The employee then must convince the court that the

discharge or employment action would not have been made if the
employee did not take the FMLA leave. 24 Consistent with Title VII

evidence to
jurisprudence, the employee must introduce sufficient
125

prove the employer's intent to succeed on the claim.
Critics denounce the McDonnell Douglas method of shifting the
burden for confusing the real issue of whether there was a statutory
violation. 26 The McDonnell Douglas framework has been greatly
modified and altered, leaving many commentators to question the
vitality of the framework in any context, including Title VII where it
originated. 127 Furthermore, it is contended that there should be no
122. Michael L. Murphy, Note, The Federal Courts' Struggle with Burden
Allocation for Reinstatement Claims Under the Family and Medical Leave Act:
Breakdown of the Rigid Dual Framework, 50 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1081, 1122-23 (2001).
123. See supra Part I.B.1.
124. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
125. See Potenza v. City of New York. 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
that the employee failed to satisfy the requirement of showing retaliatory intent,
especially given the two month delay between the employee's return to work and his
removal).
126. See Stutzke, supra note 113, at 593-94.
127. The most significant modification of the allocation of the burden of proof in
employment discrimination cases likely came from the Supreme Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Supreme Court held that in a
mixed-motive case, when there are both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
motives for the employment decision, an employer is liable. Id. at 241. Thus under
Price Waterhouse, a plaintiff prevails if he can prove discrimination was a motivating
factor. Id. If the plaintiff satisfies the burden that there was a discriminatory reason,
the employer bears the burden of justifying its ultimate decision. Id. at 246. The
employer then can establish an affirmative defense by proving he would have taken
the employment action without the discriminatory reason. Id. at 252. In the 1991
amendments to the Civil Rights Act, § 2000e-2(m) provides that there is
discrimination when the plaintiff's membership in a protected class was a "motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). However, the damages are limited if the
employer can prove that they "would have taken the same action in the absence of
the impermissible motivating factor." Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). In Desert Palace,Inc. v.
Costa, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is entitled to the mixed-motive jury
instructions whether they establish the discriminatory reason by direct or
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proof of intent requirement under these FMLA claims because they
claims for a violation of the
are not discrimination claims, but rather
12 8
interference provision of the statute.
3. DOL Regulations: Should the Courts Defer to the DOL to

Determine the Burden of Proof Structure?
The DOL regulations implemented to help enforce the FMLA are
entitled to deference by courts hearing FMLA claims.'29 Therefore, in
analyzing the various methods of approaching these claims, it is
necessary to evaluate how these methods follow the regulations.
Sometimes the courts do not explicitly rely on the regulations in their
analysis. 130 One of the frequently discussed regulations in these
FMLA cases is regulation 825.216."' In interpreting this regulation,
circumstantial evidence. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-101 (2003). In
light of this decision, commentators contend that there is no purpose for the
McDonnell Douglas framework anymore. See Davis, supra note 20, at 888-89 (arguing
that with the ability to use both circumstantial and direct evidence to support a
"mixed-motive" analysis, the McDonnell Douglas framework is no longer justified);
see also William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in
Peace?, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 199, 212-13 (2003) (arguing that McDonnell
Douglas is dead after Costa and all future cases "will be mixed motives because that
structure has a lower standard of causation than the pretext but-for standard" that
was the third step in the McDonnell Douglas approach). The Third Circuit has
applied the mixed-motive analysis to a claim under the FMLA. See Conoshenti v.
Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2004). In Conoshenti, the Third
Circuit held that once the employee demonstrated that the employee's FMLA leave
was a substantial factor in the decision to discharge the employee, the employer must
prove that it would have fired the employee even if it had not considered the FMLA
leave. Id. at 147-48.
128. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 47.
130. In Potenza v. City of New York, the Second Circuit did not discuss the DOL
regulations in its analysis, its classification of the claim, or its decision to apply the
McDonnell Douglas formula. Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165 (2d Cir.
2004).
131. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (2004). The relevant provisions of regulation 825.216
provide:
(a) An emplovee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other
benefits and conditions of emolovment than if the emplovee had been
continuouslv emploved during the FMLA leave period. An emplover must
be able to show that an emplovee would not otherwise have been emploved
at the time reinstatement is requested in order to deny restoration to
emplovment. For examole:
(1) If an emplovee is laid off during the course of taking FMLA leave and
emplovment is terminated, the emolover's responsibility to continue FMLA
leave, maintain ,roup health plan benefits and restore the emolovee cease at
the time the emolovee is laid off. provided the emplover has no continuinR
obligations under a collective bargaining agreement or otherwise. An
emolover would have the burden of proving that an emplovee would have
been laid off during the FMLA leave period and, therefore. would not be
restoration.
to
entitled
(2) If a shift has been eliminated, or overtime has been decreased, an
employee would not be entitled to return to work that shift or the original
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the Seventh Circuit in Rice described it as explaining the nature of the

substantive right, not an explanation on the allocation of the burden
of proof. 132 The court said that rather than changing the normal
allocation of burdens of proof, the regulation explains that the
employer has an opportunity to demonstrate that it would have
discharged the employee regardless of whether he took FMLA
leave. 133 Thus, the burden-shifting formula, which affords the

employer the chance to provide evidence showing his reasons for
taking the action he did, is sufficient. The burden of proof never
needs to shift to the employer.
However, commentators argue that regulation 825.216 was intended
to govern the burden of proof analysis.134 Furthermore, the language

of the regulation arguably creates an affirmative defense for an
employer to show that he would have terminated the employee,
irrespective of the employee's FMLA leave.135 By applying the
McDonnell Douglas formula, the courts ignore an independent
affirmative defense. 3 6 The McDonnell Douglas formula requires the

employer to introduce, rather than prove, a legitimate reason for
making the employment decision.
B. The Ninth Circuit'sApproach to FMLA Claims
The Ninth Circuit rejected the application of the McDonnell
Douglas formula and instead focused its analysis on whether the
employer interfered with the FMLA under § 2615(a)(1). 137 According
to the Ninth Circuit, the appropriate inquiry is whether the
employee's use of FMLA leave was a negative factor in the

overtime hours upon restoration. However, if a position on, for examole. a
niaht shift has been filled bv another emplovee, the emplovee is entitled to
return to the same shift on which employed before taking FMLA leave.
Id.
132. Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000).
133. Id.
134. Stutzke, supra note 113, at 603-04. One student commentator argues that
regulation 825.216 governs the proof structures because the regulation contains the
term "burden of proving" and is introduced under a heading, "Are there any
limitations on an employer's obligation to reinstate an employee?" Id. at 603. This
student commentator contends that this heading supports the position that regulation
825.216 controls the burden of proof because it addresses whether or not there was a
right to reinstatement that the employer violated. Id;see also Murphy, supra note 122,
at 1114 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit should have followed regulation 825.216 in
Rice).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 69-76. The Smith court held that the
employer has this burden based on the language of DOL regulations, codified at 29
C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1) (2004). Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d
955 (10th Cir. 2002).
136. Murphy, supra note 122, at 1117.
137. Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
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1. Classifying the Claim as an Interference Claim Under § 2615(a)(1)
The Ninth Circuit in Bachelder discussed when to analyze the
FMLA claim as an interference claim as compared to a discrimination
claim or a retaliation claim.13 9 The Ninth Circuit arguably clarified
which FMLA claims fall under interference and which are

discrimination. 4 ° In developing how to classify these claims, the
Ninth Circuit approach advocates a broad definition of what falls into
the interference category of FMLA claims. The Ninth Circuit found

support under the NLRA. 41

Given the similarity between the

language of the NLRA and the FMLA, 42 the Bachelder court looked
to how courts have analyzed NLRA claims of adverse employment

actions against employees who engaged in protected activity to
support its argument that an interference claim under the FMLA
includes termination.'4 3 The Bachelder court emphasized that both
the NLRA and FMLA entitle employees to engage in specific

activities.'"

Thus, the courts' interpretations of what constitutes

interference under the NLRA should be used to clarify the
"interference" terminology in the FMLA context.'45

However, it is not clear whether the Ninth Circuit negative factor
standard applies to all interference claims or only "retaliatory"
138. Id. at 1124-25.
139. Id. at 1124.
140. Stutzke, supra note 113, at 600; see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text
(discussing how interference claims under the FMLA should include employer actions
that deter participation in protected activities, including termination or adverse
decisions made because an employee used FMLA leave).
141. Bachelder,259 F.3d at 1123-24.
142. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of their
NLRA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000). Similarly, FMLA § 2615(a)(1) provides
that it is unlawful to "interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise" any right provided under the FMLA. Id. § 2615(a)(1); see also supra notes
64-66 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. In interpreting the NLRA, courts
have found a violation of section 8(a)(1) when employers engage in activities that
"tend[] to chill an employee's freedom to exercise his [NLRA] rights." Cal. Acrylic
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Bachelder, 259 F.3d
at 1123. Examples of NLRA cases that the Bachelder court relied on to support its
broad definition of interference include cases where employers were held to interfere
with employees' right by awarding preferential rights to strike replacement workers,
by threatening that employees will lose their jobs if they form a union, and for
surveillance of meetings with union organizers outside the workplace. Id. at 1123-24.
144. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1123.
145. Id. The Ninth Circuit cites Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City
Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973), where the Supreme Court held that statutes should
be interpreted in the same manner when there is similarity in the statutory language.
Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1123.
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interference claims in which an employee alleges that he has been

discriminated against for taking leave. 4 6 The question of whether the
negative factor approach should be applied to all interference claims
could create confusion on when, and in what manner, this test should
be applied.'47

2. Plaintiff's Burden to Prove FMLA Leave Was a Negative Factor

In contrast to the burden-shifting formula, the Ninth Circuit
simplified the analysis to focus on whether the FMLA leave was a
negative factor in the employment decision.148 The employee must

prove that the leave was a negative factor in an employment
decision.'49 The employee can show this element of his case by using
either direct or circumstantial evidence.15 °

This arguably simpler

method of adjudicating claims improves employees' chances of
winning without having to go through the complicated McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting process.'
However, this allocation of the burden does not afford an employer

the opportunity to explain that the employment action in question
would have been taken regardless of the leave. Thus, this approach
arguably ignores the central question of whether the employee's right
to reinstatement existed and was illegitimately denied.152
3. DOL Regulations: Deference to Regulation 825.220(c)
The Ninth Circuit explicitly discussed the DOL regulations in
formulating its negative factor test in Bachelder. The court looked to
regulation 825.220(c),153 which provides that FMLA-protected leave
146. Stutzke, supra note 113, at 601. In Bachelder, the court distinguishes
interference claims from "anti-retaliation" claims under § 2615(a)(2), which prohibit
discrimination against any individual for opposing any protected practices and from §
2615(b), which prohibits discrimination for participating in FMLA proceedings.
Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125 n.ll. The Bachelder court did not decide whether the
McDonnell Douglas approach would be applicable for the claims brought under the
anti-retaliation provisions of the FMLA. Id.
147. Stutzke, supra note 113, at 601.
148. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's negative factor test).
149. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's negative factor test).
150. Bachelder,259 F.3d at 1125.
151. Stutzke, supra note 113, at 600. Stutzke discusses how the Ninth Circuit's
"focus on the negative ramifications of FMLA-protected activity aids the court in
ascertaining what really happened without requiring the plaintiff-employee to jump
through the hoops of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm." Id.
152. Id. at 601.
153. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2004). This regulation provides:
An employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees or
prospective employees who have used FMLA leave. For example, if an
employee on leave without pay would otherwise be entitled to full benefits
(other than health benefits), the same benefits would be required to be
provided to an employee on unpaid FMLA leave. By the same token,
employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in
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cannot be a negative factor in an employment decision.1 54 Thus, the
Bachelder court deferred to the agency interpretation as required by
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council..5 5
However, the Ninth Circuit arguably relied on the wrong regulation
when it deferred to regulation 825.220. Regulation 825.220 does not
specifically address burdens of proof or the limits to the right of
reinstatement, but instead speaks to other types of interference such
as transferring or reducing hours. 156 Furthermore, the Bachelder court
did not consider regulation 825.216, which does discuss the allocation
of the burden of proof.'57 Therefore, the negative factor test arguably
does not afford an employer the opportunity to defend himself via an
affirmative defense, as required by the DOL regulations. 58
C. The Tenth Circuit'sApproach to FMLA Claims
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit did not apply the
McDonnell Douglas formula to FMLA claims. The Tenth Circuit
allowed the plaintiff to allege that her termination interfered with her
FMLA rights under an interference/entitlement theory but the court
shifted the burden of proof to the employer, consistent with the DOL
regulations. 15 9
1. Did the Tenth Circuit Determine How to Distinguish Between
Claims?
recognized
that
there
are
both
The
Tenth
Circuit
claims
and
retaliation/discrimination
interference/entitlement
claims. 6 The court held that the employee was permitted to pursue
her claim under an entitlement theory by showing that she was denied
her substantive rights under the FMLA for a reason connected with
her leave. 61 Thus, the court proceeded with an interference claim
without requiring proof of intent.'6 2 This framework is consistent with
courts' treatment of interference claims arising under the NLRA.

employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor
can FMLA leave be counted under "no fault" attendance policies.
Id.
154. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
155. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84244 (1984); supra note 47.
156. See Murphy, supra note 122, at 1114; Stutzke, supra note 113, at 603-04.
157. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
158. Stutzke, supra note 113, at 601.
159. Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 961-63 (10th Cir.
2002).
160. Id. at 960.
161. Id. at 961.
162. Id. at 960.
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because of the similarities in the
Following the NLRA is warranted
163
language of the two statutes.
Arguably, however, the Tenth Circuit did not actively classify the
claim as an interference claim, but allowed the plaintiff to pursue her

claim under the interference rather than retaliation theory."64 The
court admitted that it did not "explore[] the entire range of reasons
for

dismissal

that

would

support

interference/entitlement theory."165

recovery

under

the

Thus, it is not clear how the

Tenth Circuit would analyze a claim that alleged both
interference/entitlement and a retaliation/discrimination theory.

an

2. The Employer Carries the Ultimate Burden
The Tenth Circuit's approach shifts the ultimate burden of
persuasion to the employer. 166 Under this standard, the employer

must prove its legitimate reason for terminating the employee. 167 This
requirement arguably places the burden on the party that holds the

evidence, which helps balance the uneven power between employers
169
and employees.' 68

Thus, it is more in line with public policy.

Furthermore, employees who are challenging an employment decision
arguably receive more favorable outcomes when the burden is placed
on the employer. 7 °

However, at least one commentator has criticized this approach for
not sufficiently allowing the employee to challenge the employer's

reasons. 171 This lapse could enable employers to escape their
obligation to reinstate an employee who has taken FMLA leave.7
Although an employee does not have to prove intent to establish a
it is plausible that employees should have the
right to reinstatement,
173

opportunity to do

SO.

163. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
164. Smith, 298 F.3d at 961 (holding that "Smith's decision not to pursue her claim
under the retaliation theory is thus not fatal to her case").
165. Id. at 961.
166. Id. at 963.
167. Id.
168. Stutzke, supra note 113, at 611.
169. Id.
170. See Stacy A. Hickox, The Elusive Right to Reinstatement Under the Family
Medical Leave Act, 91 Ky. L.J. 477, 485-86 (2003) (discussing cases where summary
judgment was denied to the employer because they were unable to carry the burden
of proof).
171. Id. at 479. Stacy A. Hickox argues that the Tenth Circuit "c[a]me closer" to
examining employer's intent by looking at evidence that Smith provided on her years
of service, the employer's failure to discipline her prior to her leave, and the lack of
emphasis on training before her leave. Id. at 493.
172. Id. at 479.
173. Id. at 492. Hickox argues that the burden of proof should be structured like
that of the Equal Pay Act, where the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that the
affirmative evidence that the employer offered is pretextual, although they are not
required to prove intent. Id. at 498-99.

2005]

FAMIL Y AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

2591

3. DOL Regulations: Deference to Regulation 825.216
Commentators have commended the Tenth Circuit approach for its
deference to the DOL regulations. 7 4 It relies on the language of the
regulations to support the idea that the burden of proof should be
Unlike the
placed on an employer, instead of an employee.
McDonnell Douglas formula, an employer must prove its defense
rather than just offer evidence that it did not illegally rely on the
FMLA leave in making an employment decision." 5
However, the Smith court did not discuss the negative factor
regulation that the Bachelder court relied upon. 76 In relying on
regulation 825.216, the negative factor regulation, the Bachelder court
suggested that an employer may not have the opportunity to show
that it would have terminated the employee regardless of his taking
leave, once the plaintiff satisfies his burden of proving that the FMLA
leave was a negative factor in the decision. 77 On the contrary, the
Smith court affirmed a jury instruction that the employer had the
burden to prove that it would have terminated the plaintiff even if he
was not on FMLA leave. 7 8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's failure to discuss
regulation 825.216 has a significant impact on the outcome of a FMLA
case: the Tenth Circuit affords the employer the opportunity to raise
a defense that an employer might not be able to introduce if the court
follows regulation 825.216 as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit.
The outcome of a FMLA case will depend in large part on which
framework the court applies to address the claim. As discussed in this
part, there are advantages and disadvantages associated with the
various approaches the federal circuit courts apply. Claims under the
FMLA and work-family issues are also addressed outside of the
federal courts as tort claims and in arbitration. These alternatives
provide a comparison to the federal jurisprudence.
D. Addressing FMLA Claims in Alternative Forums
Claims under the FMLA are most frequently brought in federal
courts. However, FMLA claims are also addressed as wrongful
termination claims based on a public policy violation, and in
arbitration. Part II.D evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of
addressing FMLA claims in these alternative forums.

174. See Stutzke, supra note 113, at 608. One student commentator praises the
Tenth Circuit's reliance on DOL regulation 825.216, which specifically contains the
terms "the employer must be able to show" and "an employer would have the burden
of proving." Id.; see also Hickox, supra note 170, at 478, 486 (discussing the
importance of placing the burden on the employer pursuant to the DOL regulations).
175. See Stutzke, supra note 113, at 610.
176. Id. at 608.
177. Malin, supra note 65, at 353 n.109.
178. Id.
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1. Claims for Wrongful Termination
Congress passed the FMLA to better meet the demands of the
current worker and his family. 79 Given the strong public policy
8 courts have found
concerns motivating the passing of the FMLA,"'
that the FMLA can support a wrongful termination claim based on a
public policy violation. 8 '
Although the wrongful termination tort based on a public policy
exception limits employment-at-will, the employment-at-will doctrine
is a rule of contract law and arguably should not govern the decision
The
of whether there should be judicial recognition of a tort.'
doctrine did not develop as a "conscious determination that the
absence of job security for employees was a socially beneficial state of
affairs."' 83 Arguably, an extension of the public policy exception to
account for work-family needs is both consistent with the FMLA and
a benefit to society."M Plaintiffs are eligible for wider remedies in a
tort claim than are available under the FMLA' 85
Commentators have challenged the expansion of wrongful
termination based on a public policy exception. They warn that this
exception to employment-at-will could swallow the rule. 86 Courts are
hesitant to recognize or expand the concept because of the flexibility

179. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
180. Some of these important policy concerns include inadequate parental leave for
a parent and child to form the proper bond, the devastating effect that a job loss due
to illness could have on a family, and the increasing role workers serve as the primary
caretaker for their family members. See supra notes 1-7, 27-30 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Nelson v. United Techs., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 239, 245-48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that a violation of the state counterpart to the FMLA is a violation of a
fundamental public policy which can support a tort claim).
182. William J. Holloway & Michael J. Leech, Employment Termination: Rights
and Remedies 137 (2d ed. 1993).
183. Id.
184. See Kelly A. Timmerman, Note, Accommodating for the Work/Family
Conflict. A Proposed Public Policy Exception, 8 J.Gender Race & Just. 281, 285
(2004) (arguing that a public policy exception at the state level is necessary to ensure
parents can complete their parental obligation with an effective method of relief if
they suffer a job loss).
185. A plaintiff claiming wrongful discharge can seek to recover lost wages, lost
profits, and compensatory and punitive damages. See Holloway & Leech, supra note
182, at 713. Under the FMLA, a successful plaintiff can collect wages, salary, benefits,
liquidated damages, and equitable remedies, but there is no explicit provision for
compensatory or punitive damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A) (2000).
186. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Wilk The Impending Death of
a Doctrine, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 653, 656 (2000) (commenting that the wrongful discharge
cause of action based on public policy claims represents the most significant limitation
on the employment-at-will doctrine). Deborah A. Ballam indicates that court
recognition of a public policy exception to employment-at-will developed in the midtwentieth century with the recognition that there are emotional and social
ramifications, beyond the economic effects of losing a job. Id. at 657.
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and vagueness of what constitutes a "public policy." '87 For example, if

the FMLA supports a tort claim, it is providing job security for an
employee with family or medical needs, which is the fundamental
policy that supports the claim. If work-family issues are deemed a
fundamental policy to support a tort action, the courts will need to
decide how to handle the case of a plaintiff-employee discharged for
taking family or medical related leave from an employer who had too
few employees to be liable under the FMLA.18 8 Furthermore, the
FMLA provides its own safeguards and some courts have found that
the FMLA remedies are adequate protection and refuse to recognize
a FMLA violation1 89as a public policy sufficient to support a wrongful
termination claim.
2. Arbitration: An Adequate Alternative to Litigation of the FMLA
and Work-Family Issues?

Arbitration has become an increasingly common forum for the

resolution of employment decisions, including statutory claims.190
187. See id. at 662 (discussing that the vagueness of the concept of public policy
requires courts to be cautious in making public policy determinations).
188. See id. at 678-79. In Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., the court
recognized a common law cause of action when the employer was too small to be
charged under the ADEA for age discrimination. Kerrigan v. Magnum Entm't, Inc.,
804 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Md. 1992). It held that the exemption for small businesses
did not give the employer a "charter to discriminate." Id. However, Ballam disagrees
with this decision and contends that if the legislatures intended to exempt small
businesses only in limited circumstances, they would have so specified. Ballam, supra
note 186, at 679.
189. See, e.g., Hamros v. Bethany Homes & Methodist Hosp., 894 F. Supp. 1176,
1995) (rejecting a state law claim of retaliatory discharge brought by
1178-79 (N.D. I11.
a plaintiff fired for exercising his rights under the FMLA since the FMLA already
prohibits retaliation); Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 773 N.E.2d 526, 534 (Ohio 2002)
(holding that the FMLA remedies are broad enough to compensate an aggrieved
employee).
190. Arbitration traditionally was used in the union setting and it grew out of the
"peaceful labor relations" that were agreed to during World War II. See Laura J.
Cooper, Remarks at the 2001 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools
Section on Employment Discrimination Law, in 5 Employee Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 604,
Since the 1960s arbitration and alternative dispute resolution
606 (2001).
substantively grew into employment law, including discrimination and disability law.
Id. at 610. There was also a growth of employment arbitration in the 1980s and 1990s
as non-union employers implemented arbitration agreements. See St. Antoine, supra
note 94, at 83-84. The expansion of employment arbitration was also enhanced by the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991). Robert Gilmer, a broker, signed an agreement to arbitrate all employment
disputes when he registered as a securities representative. Id. at 23. Upon his
discharge, he brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the ADEA. Id. at 2324. The Supreme Court held that the employer could compel Gilmer to arbitrate his
ADEA claim. Id. at 23. This expanded the use of arbitration for the resolution of
federal statutory claims. There has been extensive discussion on the benefits and
disadvantages of Gilmer and its progeny. See, e.g., Michael A. Landrum & Dean A.
Trongard, Judicial Morphallaxis: Mandatory Arbitration and Statutory Rights, 24
Wm.Mitchell L. Rev. 345, 365-70 (1998).
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Arbitration is generally a faster, cheaper forum than litigating a claim
in court. 9 ' There are extensive costs and difficulties in obtaining
counsel to proceed in court."9 Given that arbitration is typically a
faster process, a claimant would have to pay attorney's fees for a
shorter period of time or could represent himself in the less formal
forum of arbitration.193 Furthermore, even if a plaintiff proceeds in
court, his claim is likely to settle out of court before the conclusion of

trial. 94 Arbitration provides a forum for an out of court settlement.'

Additionally, arbitrators have the flexibility of determining whether
which has
an employer acted reasonably in light of the circumstances,
19 6
helped balance the work-family needs of employees.

However, commentators criticize the arbitration of statutory claims,
Critics
especially if arbitration is mandated by the employer."9
contend that an individual employee should not be forced to choose

between his statutory rights or signing an employment agreement to
get a job. They contend that an agreement that is signed before a
dispute arises and is necessary to get or maintain a job cannot be a
voluntary agreement to submit the claim to arbitration. 9 Critics also
question arbitrators' knowledge of the claims they are handling.'99
It is unclear whether the arbitrators or the courts formulated
standards that adequately protect an individual's FMLA rights. The

191. See St. Antoine, supra note 94, at 92 (discussing the prevalence of backlogged
court dockets and acknowledging the devastating effect delay in resolving a claim
could have on a fired worker who is without a job or with a reduced income).
192. Id. at 91-92.
193. Id. at 91. Avoiding some of these costs might be even more important to a
plaintiff who has a FMLA claim. This person is likely to have medical expenses for
himself or a family member and the extra costs of litigation, as well as the loss of
income, could be devastating.
194. Sara Adler, Remarks at the 2001 Annual Meeting, Association of American
Law Schools Section on Employment Discrimination Law, in 5 Employee Rts. &
Emp. Pol'y J. 622, 624 (2001) (citing that approximately ninety to ninety-five percent
of all cases of any kind filed in court are resolved before trial).
195. Adler contends that arbitration is a "more humane and less expensive way of
getting to where the parties are going to get to anyway." Id. She argues: "It's not that
they are not going to resolve the case outside of court. They are going to resolve it
outside of court. [Arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution are]
just a better way of doing it." Id.
196. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing how work-family issues and medical leave are
handled in arbitration).
197. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators' Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of
Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory DiscriminationClaims, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp.
L. 1, 2-3 (2003) (describing mandatory arbitration as "antithetical" to arbitration's
history as a voluntary undertaking and in tension with a "policy against
discrimination"). Other criticisms include absence of discovery, employers' superior
knowledge of the arbitrators who specialize in employment arbitration, denial of a
right to a jury (which could result in a larger award), and the private nature of
arbitration. Id. at 22 (internal citations omitted).
198. See St. Antoine, supra note 94, at 90-91.
199. Id. at 91. Thus, an arbitrator might not have a strong background in the
FMLA and the nuances of the Act before the claim is to be decided.
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analysis used should ensure that the policies behind the FMLA are
realized. This Note offers a new framework for the analysis of FMLA
claims which compiles various elements from the standards described
in the previous two parts.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO FMLA CLAIMS THAT BETTER REFLECTS
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE FMLA's REINSTATEMENT GUARANTEE

Congress passed the FMLA to address the dilemmas workers faced
when they needed to choose between their personal or family needs
and their jobs.2" The legislative history reflects a concern with an
employee's inability to attend to their parental responsibilities upon
the birth of a child, the increased burden on individuals as a primary
caregiver for elder parents and children, and the potential for an
employee's illness to be exacerbated by the loss of his job." 1 The
FMLA created a right for an employee to take up to a twelve week
leave for a family or medical need. 2 Upon the completion of the
FMLA leave, an employer must restore an employee to the same, or
equivalent, position to the one he had when he took the leave.20 3
The purpose of the FMLA and these provisions is to create job
security for employees who need to take leave for family or medical
reasons.2" To ensure the effectiveness of these provisions, Congress
included sections that prohibit an employer from interfering with the
exercise of FMLA leave, 0 5 from discharging or discriminating against
any individual for opposing a practice that is unlawful under the
FMLA, 06 and from discriminating against an employee who
participates in FMLA proceedings or inquiries.2 7 These provisions
ensure that employees faced with serious medical and family
constraints are able to take leave with the assurance that their job will
be available upon their return.20 8
However, the current jurisprudence has weakened the FMLA by
failing to treat the right to reinstatement as a statutory entitlement.
The approaches that the courts apply fail to adequately address the
policies behind the FMLA, which sought to ensure that employees

could take family leave with the assurance that they could return to
200. See supra notes 1-7, 27-30 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 27-30.
202. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
203. Id. § 2614(a)(1)(A).
204. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Congress intended to ease the
burdens that workers faced when they were forced to decide between their family
obligations and their job security. For a discussion of testimony from workers placed
in this bind before the passage of the FMLA, see supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
205. § 2615(a)(1).
206. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
207. Id. § 2615(b).
208. See Rigler, supra note 31, at 469 (noting the importance of job security to the

FMLA).
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work. When a plaintiff claims that he was terminated because of his
taking FMLA leave, courts have applied complicated burden of proof
structures which act as barriers for an employee who attempted to
exercise a statutory right.2 °9 An employer is prohibited from using the
fact that an employee took FMLA leave to the employee's
detriment.210 An employee should not have to justify his use of family
and medical leave; the justification exists with the enactment of the
FMLA. If a plaintiff proves that FMLA leave was a motivating factor
in an adverse employment action, the employer should be liable for
the FMLA violations.2 1' The employer should, however, have the
opportunity to limit his liability by proving that the employment
decision would have been made regardless of the FMLA activities. 12
Part III.A asserts that a claim that FMLA leave was the reason for
an employee's termination should be classified as an interference
claim. Part III.B argues that the courts should apply a balancing test
to determine if the employer's action violated the FMLA. Next, Part
III.C advocates for a partial affirmative defense, which offers
employers the opportunity to limit their liability. Finally, Part III.D
identifies the lessons that the federal courts could take from other
forums which address the FMLA and work-family issues.

209. See, e.g., Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2004); Rice v.
Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2000).
210. See § 2615. Thus to effectuate these protections, the Ninth Circuit held that a
plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his taking FMLAprotected leave was a negative factor in the decision to terminate. Bachelder v. Am.
W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001); see supra notes 63, 68 and
accompanying text.
211. This is consistent with the Bachelder holding that an employer is liable if a
plaintiff proves that his exercise of FMLA rights was a negative factor in an
employment decision. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125; see also supra notes 63, 68 and
accompanying text. This also conforms to DOL regulation 825.220(c), which provides
that FMLA leave cannot be used as a negative factor in employment action. See supra
notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
212. The Tenth Circuit in Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury,Inc., placed the
burden on the employer to prove that the employee would have been dismissed
regardless of the request or taking the leave. Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 963 (10th Cir. 2002); see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
Under the Tenth Circuit approach, an employer could totally escape liability if it
proves the decision would have been made regardless of the leave. See Smith, 298
F.3d at 963. However, if the plaintiff can show that his FMLA-protected leave was a
motivation for the employment decision, the employer should not be absolved of
liability. This situation is analogous to a mixed-motive case under Title VII. If a
plaintiff could show in a Title VII mixed-motive case that the discriminatory reason
was a motivating factor, the employer is liable. However, liability could be limited if
the employer proves that the same decision would have been made in the absence of
the impermissible factor. See supra note 127.
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A. Classifying the Claim as "Interference"
The FMLA is not the first piece of legislation of its kind.213 The
courts should follow the analysis that they used with similar pieces of
legislation. The legislative history and the terminology of the statute
indicate that Congress intended the FMLA to act as a statutory
minimum labor law.214 Congress followed the language of section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA in drafting FMLA § 2615(a)(1). 215 Thus,
"interference" should be interpreted in FMLA jurisprudence as it is in
NLRA cases, to include termination and adverse employment actions
that would tend to deter an employee from making use of a statutory
guarantee.2 16 Congress intended FMLA § 2615(a)(1) to provide the
general protection for FMLA rights, while § 2615(a)(2) and (b)
specifically prohibit discrimination against employees who oppose a
practice that is unlawful under the FMLA or proceed with FMLA
claims. 17
Once classified under FMLA § 2615(a)(1), the court should not
apply the same analysis as it does with Title VII discrimination claims.
Given the similarity of the language of § 2615(a)(1) to section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA,2 18 the courts should find guidance in the NLRA, not
Title VII jurisprudence.2 19
B. Balancingthe Competing Interests to Determine FMLA Violations
Courts and the National Labor Relations Board objectively balance
the competing interest of employees and employers in analyzing a
section 8(a)(1) claim under the NLRA. 220 For example, an employer
can restrict the distribution of union literature in working areas
because of the interest in minimizing litter from discarded materials,
but the employees' interests in providing the information outweighs
the litter concerns when the distribution occurs off company
213. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 65, 114-15 and accompanying text.
216. This is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation of the
interference provisions of the FMLA. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124. By looking to
courts' interpretations of NLRA interference, the Ninth Circuit held that activities
which tend to deter employees from exercising their statutory rights constitute
Thus, termination of an employee supports an
interference. Id. at 1123-24.
interference claim. Id. at 1123; see also Malin, supra note 65, at 363 (describing the
NLRA as the "appropriate analogy" for the FMLA interference provisions); supra
notes 65, 141-43. Courts should not assume that claims alleging adverse employment
decisions because of FMLA leave are not interference claims. See supra note 58
(describing the Seventh Circuit's use of this distinction), 117-21 and accompanying
text (discussing criticisms of this distinction).
217. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 142, 145 and accompanying text.
219. A discrimination requirement should not be read into FMLA § 2615(a)(1). See
supra note 116 and accompanying text.
220. See Malin, supra note 65, at 369-70.
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property. 221 A similar balancing should be applied to FMLA §
2615(a)(1) interference claims.222
The use of a balancing test to determine if an interference violation
occurred is compatible with the Ninth Circuit's negative factor
approach to FMLA claims. If, for example, an employer terminated
an employee for excessive absences, but used the FMLA-protected

leave as a negative factor in this decision, the employee's interest in
taking protected leave should outweigh the employer's legitimate

interest in ensuring good attendance. In this example, the employer's
use of the FMLA-protected leave was a burden on the employee's

FMLA entitlement.2 23 If, however, the employer's decision was based
221. See id. at 369. Other examples of balancing under section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA, which Malin discusses, include: employees have the right to wear union
support buttons, but this could be outweighed by an employer's interest in workplace
safety; employers have the right to poll employees regarding their union interest, but
they cannot use subtle coercion or interference. Id. at 369-70.
222. Id. at 370. Malin argues the FMLA offers similar opportunities to balance the
competing employee-employer interests as the NLRA. For example, in Hammond v.
Interstate Brands Corp., the court applied a discrimination analysis to a FMLA claim
and granted summary judgment for the employer. Id. (citing Hammond v. Interstate
Brands Corp., No. IP01-0066-CM/S, 2002 WL 31093603 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2002)).
The employer offered a nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the plaintiff
because he failed to call in to work for three consecutive days in violation of company
policy. Because the plaintiff did not prove that this reason was pretextual, the third
step under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the court granted summary judgment.
Malin does not disagree with the court's decision to reject the plaintiff's claims, but
contends that the analysis was incorrect. Id. He argues that the court should have
objectively balanced the competing interests regarding the call-in requirement. Id.
Malin contends that the employer's legitimate interest in periodic communication
from an employee regarding his status while he was on leave did not interfere with
FMLA § 2615(a)(1). Id. Similarly, Malin agreed with the court's grant of summary
judgment to the employer in Pharakhone v. Nissan North America, Inc., where the
employer fired an employee for violating its policy prohibiting employment for
personal financial gain while on leave. Id. (citing Pharakhone v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,
324 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2003)). Malin contends that the employer's policy was not
interference because it did not burden the right to take leave, and the employer had a
legitimate interest in ensuring leave is only taken for valid purposes. Id. However, if
the employer reduced the benefits or eligibility for bonuses, this would interfere with
the FMLA rights and constitute a § 2615(a)(1) violation. Id. at 371.
223. Malin offers the example of an employer who has a no fault attendance
system, under which points are assessed for absences, tardy arrivals, and early
departures. See id. at 374. A particular employee was one point under termination
according to the attendance system. Id. The employee received a call at work that his
child was in an accident and was taken to the hospital emergency room. Id. The
employee left work early to be with the child. Id. Malin presents one scenario based
on this example, in which the employee needed to take leave; he notified his
supervisor and called in every day. Id. at 374-75. Upon his return, he was terminated
for violating the no fault attendance policy. Malin contends that under a balancing
approach, this employee's FMLA rights were violated. Id. at 375. If the employee did
not take the FMLA leave, he would have remained employed with his previous
attendance record of one point shy of termination. Thus, Malin argues, "the burden
that the assessment of the attendance points places on the exercise of FMLA rights
outweighs the employer's interests in enforcing its attendance plan and the discharge
will unlawfully interfere with the employee's right to take leave." Id. This is
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on a violation of an employment policy, such as a requirement that an
employee contacts a supervisor to advise the supervisor of his status
while on leave, the FMLA leave was not a negative factor in the
employment decision. Furthermore, the policy does not interfere with
the employee's right to take his FMLA leave, but rather gives
employers an opportunity to regulate employees on leave, which is a
legitimate employer interest.224

Analysis that applies a balancing of the competing interests of
employers and employees is also used in arbitration.

Arbitrators

frequently address grievances regarding family and medical leave,
either as an explicit FMLA claim or as a grievance that the employer's
decision was not made with reasonable or just cause.225 When
deciding whether the employer's decision was reasonable, the
arbitrator will often look to the reasonableness of the employee's
request for leave. 226 Arbitrators have found that an employee's
necessity to take leave for family or medical reasons is a reasonable
request and an employer should grant the leave. 227 Arbitrators have

the discretion to take into account various family and medical
concerns,

as well

as

the employee's

overall

attendance

and

performance record, in determining the reasonableness of the
employment action.228 However, arbitrators still hold both parties to
Thus, like NLRA analysis,
act reasonably and responsibly. 229
arbitrators balance the reasonableness of an employer's and

employee's actions to determine if the employer's actions were
consistent with the Ninth Circuit's negative factor approach because the employee's
FMLA-protected leave to care for his sick child was a negative factor in the
employer's decision to terminate. In a second scenario, the employee did not attempt
to notify his supervisor that he was leaving early or the reason for his leaving; he also
did not call in to report his absence on the subsequent days. Id. The employee was
terminated for violating the workplace rule that requires an employee to report to a
supervisor if he is leaving before a shift ends and to call in absences before the shift
starts. Id. Malin contends that these requirements do not significantly burden the
exercise of FMLA rights and the employer has a substantial interest in receiving
notice. Id. at 374-75. The plaintiff-employee in this second scenario would likely have
difficulty meeting the Ninth Circuit's negative factor test as well because it is unlikely
that he would be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the leave was
a negative factor in the decision to terminate. See Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc.,
259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001). A court would likely find that the employee's
failure to notify, and not his taking leave, was the reason for the termination.
224. See supra note 223 (discussing Malin's second scenario where there was no
interference).
225. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
226. See Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98, at 89.
227. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing an arbitrator's decision
that the grievant should not have been disciplined because her child's sickness was a
reasonable basis to request leave).
228. Arbitrators have taken into consideration child care needs, employee's past
attendance record, the adequacy and timeliness of the request for leave, whether
there were emergency medical conditions, and the employer's operational needs. See
Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98, at 88-93.
229. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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warranted. While arbitration should not replace litigation of FMLA
claims, the use of an analysis of the reasonableness of both parties'
actions could be beneficial to the judicial forum.
C. Employer's PartialAffirmative Defense
Courts need to recognize that the right to reinstatement is a
statutory entitlement, and they should allocate the burden of proof
structure accordingly. The proof requirements placed on employees
should not be as rigid as the McDonnell Douglas formula.230 The
interference provision contained in § 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA is
modeled after the NLRA and should follow a similar analysis. 23 1 By
applying the McDonnell Douglas formula to § 2615(a)(1) claims, the
courts are reading a discrimination requirement into a provision of
which it was not intended to be a part. 32 The plaintiff should have to
prove that his FMLA-protected leave was a negative factor in the
employment decision and therefore the employer unreasonably
interfered with his FMLA entitlement. 33 Placing this lighter burden
on a plaintiff would be the most effective way to enforce the FMLA in
light of the policy concerns that motivated Congress, and many state
legislatures, to pass the legislation. 34 An employee who has a
qualifying medical or family need is entitled to take FMLA leave with
the protection of reinstatement. 235 Thus, any employment action that
was detrimental to the employee's position because of his taking leave
should be actionable under the FMLA.
However, to be consistent with the policies behind the FMLA, it is
also necessary to recognize the needs of employers in having efficient
and reliable employees. Thus, employers should have an affirmative
defense if they could prove that they did not take the employment
action because of the FMLA leave, but rather because of a legitimate
business reason.236 Unlike the McDonnell Douglas approach, the
employer should be required to prove this defense, not just present it
to the court. 37 Nevertheless, the employer should not be completely
absolved of liability if the plaintiff proves that the FMLA leave was a
230. See, e.g., Hickox, supra note 170, at 478 (advocating for employers to carry the
burden of proof and for employees to have the right to offer evidence that the
employer's proffered evidence is pretext).
231. See supra Parts III.A-B.
232. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Part III.B.
234. See supra notes 1-7, 27-31, 37 and accompanying text (describing the policies
and legislative history behind the FMLA).
235. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614(a) (2000).
236. See Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 963 (10th Cir.
2002).
237. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof during the entire litigation and the employer's burden is limited to offering, not
proving, a nondiscriminatory reason. See supra notes 20, 54 and accompanying text.

2005]

FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEA VE ACT

2601

factor in the employment decision. If the employer can prove that,
despite using the FMLA-protected leave as a negative factor in the
employment decision, the same employment decision would have
been made based on legal factors, the employer's liability should be
limited.2 38
Thus, the policies of job security and an entitlement to restoration
are best effectuated by a simplified proof structure which affords both
employees and employers adequate protections. First, as Part III.B
describes, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that his FMLA leave was a negative factor in an employment decision;
thus the employer unreasonably interfered with his FMLA rights
under § 2615(a)(1). The employer can attempt to refute that the leave
was a negative factor by offering evidence that the leave was
irrelevant and the employment decision was based solely on a legal
factor. The court should apply a balancing test to determine if there
was a violation of the FMLA. If the plaintiff satisfies this burden, the
employer is liable. The employer's liability could be limited if he
could prove that the same decision would be made absent the illegal
factor. However, even if the employer proves this defense, he should
still be partially liable because the employer illegally relied on the
employee's use of FMLA leave as a motivation for his decision.
D. Deference to DOL Regulations 825.216 and 825.220(c)
The DOL regulations are entitled to deference in determining the
proper standard and burden of proof allocation for FMLA claims.2 39
The proof structure just expressed is consistent with all of the relevant
regulations. First, it is consistent with regulation 825.220(c) because it
prohibits FMLA-protected leave from being used as a negative factor
in employment. 24" The Ninth Circuit's approach is governed in large
part by this regulation. 241 The proof structure this Note advocates,
like the Ninth Circuit approach, holds an employer liable if he uses
FMLA leave to the employee's detriment as required by regulation

825.220(c).
The framework this Note suggests is also consistent with regulation
825.216, which requires that the employer demonstrate that the
employee would not otherwise have been employed regardless of his
taking FMLA leave.24 2 Based on this regulation, an employer can
deny restoration to an employee only if he could show that at the time
reinstatement was requested, the employee would not have been

238. This is comparable to the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive proof structure that
amended Title VII in 1991. See supra notes 127, 212 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 63, 153-54 and accompanying text.
241. See Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
242. See supra notes 74-76, 131, 134-36 and accompanying text.
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employed.243 If the employer did not take into account the FMLA
leave in deciding to terminate the employee, the plaintiff did not
prove his claim. 24 If, however, the plaintiff satisfied his burden,
regulation 825.216 creates an affirmative defense for employers.245
The defense should not completely absolve the employer of liability
because that would contradict regulation 825.220. Instead, the
employer's liability should be limited if the employer unlawfully relied
on FMLA leave but can show that there were legal motives for the
employment decision as well. Thus, like mixed-motive cases under
other federal legislation,246 a partial affirmative defense helps resolve
the tension between the DOL regulations and balances the
employees' and employers' respective interests.
E. The FMLA in Other Forums: The Lessons to Be Learned

The courts have neglected to adjudicate FMLA claims in a way that
reflects the importance of providing employees with the assurance
that taking leave will not have an adverse effect on their
employment.247 The complicated burden of proof structures that
many courts have applied have hindered employees from holding an
employer liable for denying them their FMLA entitlement. 24' Thus,
employees have sought other forums to resolve their work-family
issues. Some plaintiffs have attempted to pursue a termination claim
under the concept of wrongful termination based on a public policy
violation. 249 Although public policy torts have been criticized as
ignoring common law principles of employment-at-will,25 ° the focus on
policy forces the court to recognize the employees' needs that the
statute was implemented to address. 1
There are drawbacks to the recognition of a tort claim based on
FMLA violations. What constitutes a "public policy" to support a tort
claim is vague and there is concern that employment-at-will could
become the exception rather than the rule. 2
Furthermore,
commentators contend that Congress prohibited specific acts within
the FMLA and made conscious decisions regarding what is actionable
243. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (2004).
244. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 157-58, 174-75 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 127, 212 and accompanying text.
247. See Rigler, supra note 31, at 469 (emphasizing the central importance of job
security to the FMLA).
248. See, e.g., Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004)
(denying the plaintiff's claim that the employer violated § 2615(a)(1) because the
plaintiff failed to prove retaliatory intent).
249. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 186-87.
251. See, e.g., Nelson v. United Techs., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 239, 247-48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (discussing the fundamental and substantial policy of promoting stability and
economic security in families).
252. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
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and the remedies available. Courts should not judicially expand the
FMLA protections.253

If courts shift their focus from complicated burden of proof
structures to a focus on the FMLA entitlements, there would be no

need for judicial expansion of tort principles to protect employees
from employment decisions made on the basis of family and medical
leave. When courts analyze FMLA claims there should be recognition

of the importance of economic security and stability for families as the
courts have recognized in the tort actions.254
Arbitration is another forum in which employees attempt to resolve
their FMLA claims. There are significant benefits in settling a dispute
outside of the litigation process. 255 The advantages of getting a faster
and less expensive resolution are very valuable to an employee out of
However, arbitration decisions and the analysis that
work.25 6
arbitrators apply should not be determinative in FMLA jurisprudence.

There are several important distinctions between arbitration and
federal litigation, including the types of issues that are addressed in
the different forums. Arbitrators do not always address FMLA claims
when they analyze work-family issues in arbitration.257 Furthermore,
the extent to which arbitrators have a working knowledge of federal
statutes is not always clear.25 s Unlike courts, arbitrations do not
establish precedents and are not bound by precedents. Arbitration
decisions are generally private and, therefore, are not subject to public
approval. 5 9 Moreover, many arbitration decisions are not published.
Thus, any study of those that are published might not be
representative of all arbitration decisions. 6 °

253. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing a critique of the
expansion of federal employment law through common law causes of action).
254. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
257. For example, the inability to get child care for a child that is not suffering from
any medical ailments is not protected under the FMLA. Nevertheless, arbitrators
have examined child care constraints in just cause analysis. See supra notes 104-05 and
accompanying text. However, child care concerns that arise out of a child's medical
needs could be entitled to FMLA protection.
258. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
259. See St. Antoine, supra note 94, at 91 (discussing the lack of public
accountability of private arbitrators). The shift of civil rights cases from courts to
arbitration decreases the number of published court decisions, which could be
detrimental to the development of law itself. Id.
260. The arbitration decisions relied on in this Note came primarily from the
Wolkinson and Ormiston article. Wolkinson & Ormiston, supra note 98. Their
research was based on a review of discipline arbitrations reported by the Bureau of
National Affairs and Commerce Clearing House between 1985 and 2003. Id. at 86.
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While arbitration can be an excellent forum for settling
employment disputes,2 61 mandatory arbitration agreements are a
cause for concern.262 When an employee signs an agreement to
arbitrate employment disputes, it is frequently before any dispute
arises and is a condition to getting, or keeping, a job. 263 Especially
given the unexpected conditions that could cause an employee to need
FMLA leave, these pre-dispute agreements are arguably involuntary.
An employee should not be compelled to bring a claim arising out of
his FMLA entitlement in a forum that could produce a less favorable
outcome than the resolution that could be received in court. 6
Arbitration should not be a mandatory forum for an employee to
resolve FMLA claims. 265 If the arbitration is properly structured, an
employee could voluntarily choose that forum and take advantage of
the flexibility of arbitration .2 6' Arbitrators are not constrained by
rigid proof structures that could, dominate judicial litigation.
Regardless of the extent of the use of arbitration for resolving FMLA
claims, the lessons of balancing the employees' and employers'
interests to determine if the employment decision was reasonable
could be adapted for the judicial forum.
CONCLUSION

In handling FMLA claims, courts have focused on complicated
burden of proof structures at the expense of the public policies behind
the enactment of the FMLA. Congress wanted to ensure that
employees were not forced to choose between attending to their
family or medical needs and their jobs. Thus, the FMLA provides an
entitlement to reinstatement and prohibits employers from interfering
with employees' FMLA rights.2 67 However, courts have failed to treat
the FMLA leave as a statutory right and many courts have placed

261. There are many benefits to arbitration including lower costs than those
associated with litigation, faster resolution of cases, and the existence of a structured
forum for out of court settlements. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (criticizing mandatory
arbitration for forcing an individual employee to decide between his getting or
keeping a job and his statutory rights). Reginald Alleyne argues that Theodore St.
Antoine and other commentators who support arbitration presuppose that the
mandatory arbitration processes are "properly designed." See Alleyne, supra note
197, at 23. He contends that commentators and the courts avoid the discussion of
"whether Congress intended to permit the enforcement of mandatory-arbitration
agreements covering federal statutory claims." Id. at 27. Alleyne concludes that by
avoiding this discussion, the "perceptions of the beneficial consequences of
mandatory arbitration [are] largely irrelevant." Id.
265. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 225-29 (describing arbitrators' focus on the
reasonableness of the actions in light of all of the relevant circumstances).
267. See supra Part I.A.
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onerous burdens of proof on employees. As the Second Circuit's
opinion in Potenza v. City of New York 268 demonstrates, courts are
unclear on how to designate a FMLA claim, they apply complicated
proof structures which unnecessarily burden plaintiff-employees, and
they fail to adequately defer to the DOL regulations. 69
This Note suggests that courts could simplify their analysis and
simultaneously improve their commitment to the public policy and
legislative history behind the FMLA. Courts should (1) recognize that
the general protection of FMLA rights exists in § 2615(a)(1);2 11 (2)
balance the interests of an employer and an employee to determine if
an employer is liable for interfering with FMLA leave;27 and (3)
afford an employer the opportunity to limit his liability if he can show
that, despite his reliance on FMLA-protected leave, he would have
made the same employment decision based on other factors.272
This framework is consistent with other federal labor standards,
namely the NLRA. 273 Furthermore, it adequately defers to the DOL
regulations.27 4 Most importantly, this analysis reduces the burden that
courts have placed on plaintiffs to ensure that an employee's right to
take leave, and the corresponding entitlement to reinstatement, are
protected to reflect the public policies that motivated Congress to
enact the FMLA.275

268. 365 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2004).
269. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Part III.A.
271. See supra Part III.B.
272. See supra Part III.C.
273. See supra Parts LII.A-B (discussing how courts should follow the NLRA in
defining and interpreting interference claims in the FMLA jurisprudence).
274. See supra Part III.D.
275. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing the need for sick
leave, parental leave for the birth of a child, and leave to care for a sick family
member as reasons for Congress's enactment of the FMLA).
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